Canadian-American interplay in Asia 1945--1968. by Scarfia, William M.
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers 
1-1-1969 
Canadian-American interplay in Asia 1945--1968. 
William M. Scarfia 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Scarfia, William M., "Canadian-American interplay in Asia 1945--1968." (1969). Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations. 6587. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6587 
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor 
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, 
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, 
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder 
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would 
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or 
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email 
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. 
OANADIAN-AMEEIOAN IBTERPLAY IN ASIA 1945-1968
Submitted to the Department of Political Science 
of the University of Windsor, in partial fulfill­
ment of the requirements for the degree of Master 
of Arts.
by
William M. Soarfia B.A.
Faculty of Graduate Studies 
1969
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EC52770
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
UMI Microform EC52770 
Copyright 2008 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 E. Eisenhower Parkway 
PC Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Approved
CÇ t his
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
Although a study of Canadian--American interplay in Asia 
from 1945 -1967 reveals marked similarities in the attitudes 
of both countries, it also uncovers some Interesting diffe­
rences.; In view of the power disparity between Canada and the 
United States, one may be tempted to attribute the similarities 
solely to American predominance. A closer study of Canadian 
reactions to American policy, however, reveals that it is due 
as much to the Canadian perception of events in Asia as to 
United States predominance. This discussion of Canadian- 
American interplay in Asia will show that, in the final analy­
sis, these singularly Canadian perceptions dictated her po­
licies, and that Canada was not prepared to follow blindly the 
ramifications of United States policy. The American influence 
on Canadian policy, although undeniably present, was not always 
the overriding Canadian concern.
Canadian-American interplay during the Korean War and in 
Vietnam has shown that the extent to which Canada was prepared 
to go in following the American lead was determined more by 
her concept of national interest than by securing a sympathetic 
outlook from Washington. Canadian action on the question of 
Communist Chinese recognition can also be seen as an attempt 
to further these interests, but in this instance defering to 
American views in the interest of maintaining Canadian-American
ill
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rapport was thought to be in Canada's best interest.
In all three areas of study, reasonable justification 
for Canadian positions can be found in terms other than a 
simple deference to Washington per se. Although the line 
between deference and self-interest may at times become 
blurred, at no time did Canada forego what she believed to 
be a pursuit of singularly Canadian interests in favor of 
those of the United States,
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IINTRODUCTION
aspect of Canadian-American relations is condition­
ed by the fact that the United States is a super-power and
Canada is not. This is always at the heart of their mutual
1
involvement anywhere, but it is seen especially in Asia. In­
herent volatility and the People's Republic of China combine 
to make Asia an extremely difficult area with which to deal. 
Moreover, Canada has neither the power nor the capacity to 
pursue as wide a range of global endeavor as does the United 
States. Because the latter is committed in Asia presently in 
Vietnam, previously in Korea and Euomintang China, and before 
World War II in trade and the "Open Door" policy, Canadian 
involvement must defer to an American presence which has been
p
evident since the late eighteenth century." There is, in ad-
1
For our purposes, the term "Asia" will mean the Southern, 
South-Eastern and Eastern portions of the continent, compris­
ing Indochina, China, India and Korea, but excluding Soviet 
Asia, the Middle East and, unless otherwise referred to, fringe 
portions such as Indonesia, Malaysia etc. Japan, admittedly, 
is a special case, as are the Philippines, and unless otherwise 
stated, will not fall under the term "Asia" in this discussion.
2
The earliest United States trading contacts with China 
date from the 1784 voyage of Empress of China. Between that 
time and 1811, the United States was the "most serious rival 
of the British in tea trade at Canton." See P.E. Clyde, The 
Far East : A History of the Impact of the Rest on Eastern Asia. 
New York: 1952, p. 126-129. The quote appears on p. 127.
1
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2dltlon, another aspect of American involvement which poses 
difficulties for the Canadian position in Asia - the American
notion of a messianic mission to deliver the world generally
3
and Asia specifically from Communism.
Before dealing with the more complex reasons for Ameri- 
cari involvement, it will be useful to define the concept of 
interplay as it pertains here. Interplay will mean a mutual 
involvement in Asia on the part of Canada and the United Sta­
tes. This does not mean, however, an involvement by one 
simply because the other has chosen to formulate or imple­
ment policy vis-a-vis a specific Asian area. That is, a 
prior amenability, other than the warrants of normal diplo­
matic activity, is not suggested. Interplay does suggest, 
however, that in areas where both have chosen to become in- 
volved there is influence on one or the other corresponding 
to their individual power positions, and how one country
3
See E. Stillman and W. Pfaff, The New Politics: Ameri- 
ca and the Post War World. (New York : ' 1 961 ') "p. 23 and 
A similar view is taken by J. ¥. Spanier. American Foreign 
Policy Since World War II, (New York: 1960) p.1-13.
It is also important to note here that the American con­
ception of Asia. before World War II included mainly China, 
the Philippines and Japan. It was with China and the Phili­
ppines, however, that American tutelage was especially in ev­
idence. See H. R. Isaacs. Scratches on Our Minds; American 
Images of India and China. (New York; 196 2 ) ('5'apr'icorn Edl-" 
tion).
Canada, however, looked at Asia very much in terms of 
the British Asian Empire, later Commonwealth, of India, Cey­
lon and later Pakistan, since these were her main contacts 
with that continent.
The significance of these tw^ dissimilar views of Asia 
become important, especially in light of developments in 
China since 1949.
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3perceives the relevance of that particular position in the 
context of the then existing situation. While for Canada, 
American support will normally be sought in any dealings, in 
certain situations Canada will also defer to American policy 
in favor of continuing Canadian-American rapport. Conversely, 
while the Canadian position generally is not as important to 
the United States, there will be times when Canada's support 
is valuable to American policy. In these situations Ameri­
can policy will, in turn, either defer to or encourage the 
Canadian position.
Simply, interplay will be an examination of fields of ac­
tivity where Canada and the United States have seen fit to 
formulate a policy which elicits some action by the other.
From this it may be determined what is the extent of influ-
4
ence either on Canada or the United States. Similarly, the 
extent to which Canada will conform to United States policy 
will also become apparent and, when she does not, how far she 
will diverge and why. Interplay, then, with special reference 
to Canada, will be a study of questions that are of signifi- 
cant import to warrant defined policy, and the degree to 
which that policy is or is not pursued when the United States 
is involved. With this in mind we can now deal with some of
4
There are influences on Canada other than that of the 
United States. The attitudes of Great Britain and India have, 
on occasion, been among the determinants of Canadian policy. 
However, it will not be within the scope of this paper to deal 
with all of them, but only those which in some way have an ef- 
fect on Canadian-American mutual Involvement.
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4the reasons for American Involvement In Asia.
The United States has had somewhat of an emotional Id-
5
entlflcation with Asia. It was the United States, among
others, which tried to educate and civilize parts of Asia 
with missionary and medical teams since the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Similarly, it was the United States
6
which tried to save Ohiang Kai-shek's regime from 1941-1949. 
She did so obviously not only out of self-interest, but out 
of a conviction that if Asia (i.e.China) could not take care 
of herself then America would try to do it for her. This
attitude was a form of spiritual "Manifest Destiny" to lead
7
Asia from the "wilderness". There grew, then, a special
kinship with parts of Asia that has, in varying degrees, ner-
8
vaded American dealings with her. This mission, however.
5
On this point see Isaacs, op. cit.. Chapters 5-9, ahd 
also J.K. Fairbank, The United States and China,(Cambridge: 
1 9 6 2, Chapter l4. Also, Foster Hhea Dulles, China and Amer- 
ica: The Story of their Relations Since 1784, Yor^^f967)
and'A . Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United 
ütates, (New Haven: 1 9 6 2) Chapter 1, esp. p. 17.
6
See Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1949, 
(Chicago, 1963) and The China White Paper, August 1949, 
(Stanford: 1967). The last is the official United States 
record of involvement in China, with emphasis on the period 
194l—19 4 9.
7
See I.L. Horowitz, The Three Worlds of Development; The 
Theory and Practice of International"'"stfatification. (New 
York: 1 9 6 6) Chapter's 3 and 4"! Also ' Stillman and Pfaff, op.
bit., p.23.
8
See Tyler Dennett, Americans in East Asia, (New York:
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5has been plagued by a general lack of success in Aslan in­
volvement since World War II. Indeed, Euomintang China fell, 
SEATO was less than effective, Korea is still divided, and 
Vietnam is, in 1969, a blight oh American policy. It was 
paradoxical, moreover, that all this was thrust upon the 
acknowledged most powerful nation in the world. Thus, be­
cause of the enormous American capabilities, anything less 
than complete success in Asian dealings brought disillusion.. 
All these factors complicate Canada's pursuit of her Asian 
policies.
Canada, by virtue of common European heritage and simi­
lar cultures, finds herself in the difficult position of at 
once supporting United States grand goals In Asia, while 
necessarily hesitating at some of the means to effect them. 
While it was, and very much still is, in Canada's interest 
to support America's world posture, if not her tactics, she
Tite of the United States. Canada, therefore, has had to
walk the narrow line between possible subordinance and pur-
suit of self-interest in order to realize the goals that are
t ”      ' " "
set by her concept of the "middle power". Thus, hers was 
the difficult task of fulfilling the American desire for 
support, while avoiding the stigma of appearing merely a
1926) Chapter 19. Also J.W. Masland, "Missionary Influence 
Upon American Far Eastern Policy", Pacific Historical Review. 
Vol.X, September 3, 194l, p.279-296, and W.E. Daughtery, 
"China's Official Publicity in the United States", Public 
Opinion Quarterly. Spring 1942, p.70-86.
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6"rubber-stamp" for American policy. This pursuit as It per­
tained to Asia was a particularly difficult one to realize.
Because Canada was not deeply involved in Asia until 
after 1945, her activity there had been determined by lar­
ger global circumstances. Professor Spencer suggests that 
not until Chiang's fall could Canada be said to have a pe­
culiarly Asiatic policy, that is, a policy in which Oanadian- 
Asian circumstances were at the root instead of Canadian- 
global ones. Her policies there were facilitated by the fact 
that she was neither mean nor offensive and had herself once 
been a colony. The fact is that, outside of India, Canada 
has had no special ties with Asia. Indeed, she has by any 
standard been pragmatic in her Asian dealings, and her pol­
icies there have been dictated more by logic than by mêssian- 
ism. This fact is at once the reason why she has the poten­
tial to pursue an independent approach to Asia, and why she 
must at times accord deference to American pretensions in the 
area.
However, if logic dictates that a Canadian presence in 
Asia can be helpful to world peace and, in turn, Canadian in­
terests, then it also dictates that the United States can be 
a more useful friend than enemy. Her Asian involvement, 
therefore, must be conditioned to a great degree by anticipa­
ted American reactions. The point at which Canada presumably
foregoes her own interpretation of Asian circumstances
those of the United States, is necessarily the point at which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
American Influence 
either lessens her 
pgsTtion where sh. 
ved as the United States, then Canada takes a more indepen-
acknnwl edged . Conversely, where
ftnt tn Amerirnn policy, or takes a
xy 1.n,v.olT
dent approach to her foreign policy.
The fact is, that while Canada rarely initiates sweep­
ing policy, she does react to great power endeavors. The 
degree of reaction to United States policies, then, is often 
the measure of Canada's independence in foreign policy. It 
will be the purpose of this paper to show that Canadian pol­
icies in Asia are largely reactions to American policies 
there, not unilateral Canadian decisions. Towards Korea,
Vietnam and the question of Communist Chinese recognition, 
Canadian policies have been largely influenced by American 
positions and policies.r-In thèse areas Canada has shown a fore- 
bearance to American policies even when an independent role would 
have been useful in the form of greater world security. It will 
also be seen that Canadian influence has been effective only in 
areas where it modifier of American policy, and only, 
then when it was accompanied by similar American predispositions. 
In such instances as these, Canada's reaction was dictated more 
by'^If-interest and concern for world peace than by United 
States influence. Basically, hppansp Canada was not prepared 
to pursue at length all the ramifications of America^ policies.
she tried to tone them down. To that extent at least, Canada's 
desire for continued ease in Canadian-American relations was 
superceded by her concern for world security.
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II
BACKGROUND: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
AFTER UORLD WAR II
In discussing Canadian-American interplay in Asia since 
World War II it will be necessary to examine briefly the wide 
range of goals and policies pursued by both countries since 
1 9 4 5 . The extent and effectiveness of mutual involvement in 
Asia can only be determined within the context of the general 
foreign policy orientations of Canada and the United States.
It will be seen that the positions of both countries after 
the war had much to do with their respective reactions to de- 
velopments in Asia in succeeding years.
The close of World War II brought with it more than an 
end to hostilities; it brought, for all intents and purpos­
es, a re-shuffling of the international state system. Alth- 
ough the war had been won, the victory proved a costly one for 
the Allies. While Germany had been defeated and Japan crip­
pled, Great Britain and France had found it difficult to ad­
just in the post-war years, and this was generally true of most 
of Europe. Indeed, there were few countries to come out of 
that conflict relatively unscathed; two of these were Canada 
and the United States. They were to form their post-war po­
licy goals, therefore, in the context of a much stronger posi­
tion vis-a-vis most of the West.
8
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9Canada, unlike Britain and most of the other allies,
"had not been bled white economically In the effort to ach-
1
leve victory" in World War II. Unlike the other nations of 
Europe "her territory had not been a battlefield, nor had 
her people been subjugated by the occupation."^ She was, 
moreover, in the throes of an economic expansion which was 
"capable even of assisting the ruined great powers of the
3
pre-war world." Indeed, given immunity from invasion,
Canada's development as a power in post-war politics was
4
inevitable. As the post-war years progressed, however,
Canada soon found her immediate power position to be tenuous. 
While she was not small enough to be ignored, neither was she 
large enough to be feared, and Canada saw herself precariously 
in the middle of the Cold War, She was, therefore, "faced 
with the problem of finding for herself a place in interna­
tional councils appropriate to her position as something less 
than a major and more than a minor p o w e r . I n  this pursuit.
1
II. Se ford, Canada and Three Crisis, (Lindsay, Ontario : 
1 9 6 8) p.2. See also R. Spender^ Canada in World Affairs 1946- 
19 4 9, (Toronto: 1959) Chapter I.
2
Ibid, p.2.
3
John Holmes, "Canadian External Policies Since 1945", 
International Journal, Spring 1963, V0I.1 8 , p.137-148.
4
H.P. Angus, Canada and the Far East 1940-1953, (Toronto: 
1953) p.19.
5
Holmes, op.cit. As will be seen in Chapter III this place 
was the United Nations.
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10
moreover, she could not afford to neglect the one country
which would be most involved with any international role,
the United States.
While this search was first accentuated in the early
post-war years, it has become one of the aims of present day
Canadian policies. How she has resolved it will go a long
way in explaining the general tone of Canadian-American in-
6
terplay and will be dealt with more fully later. Suffice 
it to say now that her role evolved to one of nominal inde­
pendence and pragmatic forebearanoe, largely unforseen in
1945.
For the United States, it was not as necessary to find 
a role then, as to acCept the one thrust upon her. At the 
close of World War II she inherited the consequences of a 
basic change in the global power structure. This change was 
a shift in the center of gravity in the Western world from 
the capitals of Western Europe to Washington. The end re^ 
8&#of a change which had been going on Imperceptibly for the
first half of the twentieth century, this shift was greatly
7
accelerated by the impact of two world wars. More than a 
difference of emphasis, however, this shift created a power 
vacuum "in those parts of the world which had formerly been
6
See Conclusion,
7
See, J.P. Warburg, The United States in the Post-war 
World, (New York: 1966) p.30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
owned, controlled or dominated by Western Europe This 
process had left the United States with more comprehensive 
obligations and less opportunity for 'masterful inactivity'.^ 
Indeed, by 1948 it became apparent that ^masteffUl"inactivity" 
was not going to forestall Communist expansion, nor could it 
formulate policy to meet this expansion.
Basically the Soviet challenge "compelled the American 
people (as well as the American government) to accept the 
responsibilities of moral and political leadership that his- 
tory plainly intended it to bear. While entanglement in
World War I did not succeed in awakening the United States 
to a clear comprehension that responsibilities and national 
power were one, perhaps involvement in World War II could. 
Thus, after 1945, the United States was aware of at least
two factors. One was that "responsibility conoommitant with
1 1influence could not be avoided with impunity." The other 
was that the use of "American capabilities to influence
Ibid. p.30.
9
W.A. Wilcox, Asia and United States Policy, (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey : 1967) p.1.
10
George Kennan, cited in D. Brandon, American Foreign 
Policy; Beyond Utopianism and Realism. (New"York : 1966), p.4.
11
R.S.Synder and E.S. Furness, American Foreign Policy, 
(New York:1954), p.571.
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12
the International environment was a necessity and a responsl-
12
blllty." Awareness of responsibility, however, and effect­
ing it proved to be two different things for American foreign 
policy at that time. The overwhelming national power possess­
ed. by the United States after 1945 offered her one great po­
tential advantage, the initiative. "That the United States
has not taken the initiative more often sneaks to the pro-
1 3
blem of purpose rather than capacity." The problem of 
purpose, moreover, is evident in one word,containment.
It must be remembered at this point that, because Amer­
ican capabilities and power were more stable than those of 
Canada, she could conceiveably outline definite foreign pol­
icy goals. Whatever else they may have been accused of being, 
these goals were at least concise and with a purpose, to halt 
the Communist threat.
Canada, however, could not be as sure-footed in her post­
war relations. Her greater power position after the war was 
more inflated than that of the United States, more easily 
subject to change, and thus more tenuous. However, precisely 
because she was not as powerful as the United States, her 
policies could be more aspiriatibnal:andfthus more flexible. 
Canada, it will be seen, evolved to a position, for example
12
Ibid, p.571 . Soviet activity in Eastern Europe had at 
least proved that.
13
Wilcox, op. cit., p.20.
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in Korea, where she could bend on Issues when the United 
States could not. Since American policies had outlined de­
finite aims, subsequent positions would necessarily be jud­
ged in that context. Thus, when she had crossed the thirty- 
eighth parallel and approached the Yalu, it became difficult 
to turn back from what was ostensibly a desire to unify Korea 
by force. Because she had outlined a definite policy of con­
tainment by that time, the United States was similarly hard 
put to deviate suddenly and accept a theory of limited war. 
Canada, however, did not find herself in such a position where 
she would have to disavow her own hard and fast policy.
This difference in policy criteria is important in 
Canadian-American relations, since it explains at once why 
the United States is in a position to lose face while Canada 
is not. So too, it enables Canada to adjust her policy so as
not to incur needless hostility from Washington. For this
reason, then, Canadian obduracy on questions not involving
world security will come more slowly and be reconciled more 
easily than will Washington's. This same Canadian obstinacy.
however, will also tend to make Washington less indulgent 
when Ottawa's policy does not coincide with that of the 
United States. Because Canada can be more flexible on so 
many issues, any deviation from the American "lead" will make 
Washington look upon her less favorably. Because the United 
States has so much at stake in the form of prestige on vir*. 
every question of international import, much more so
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4
than Canada, Canadian policy is thus expected to conform to 
and complement that policy. This American expectation and 
the way in which Canada perceives it is an important factor 
in Canadian-American relations and will be seen in the Com­
munist Chinese recognition question.
The policy of containment was first formulated by George
   """   -    ,
Kennan in his 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."
This concept was, and is now, the rationale for American
foreign policy. In effect, containment was an answer to the
innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism....which
 ------------------- ^ ------------------ .14
had become imbedded in the foundations of Soviet power,"
Since Russia was the most powerful Socialist state at the
time, Moscow and Socialism (i.e. Communism) were thought to 
be synonymous. Thus,the antagonism of Socialism and Capital­
ism was felt to be one between Russia and the United States. 
This antagonism, in turn, manifests itself in Moscow's expan­
sive tendencies. American foreign policy, it was felt, had 
to contain this expansion.
Basically, the United States would meet the Russian ex­
pansion wherever it occurred and "build situations of strength
15
to meet the Communist challenge." Such was the rationale
(3 ) Ay,
J. Burnham, Containment or Liberation. (New York;1952) /rx 
p.1 5-2 1 .
15
Ibid, p.21. By the time containment was formulated, 
what came to be known as the Cold War had set in. Russian ac­
tivity in Eastern Europe and the Middle East seemed to cement 
geographical divisions into ideological ones as well. It was 
actions such as these which conditioned the Cold War, and it 
was against this background that containment was formulated.
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for enormous aid to Europe through the Marshall Plan, Point 
Pour and the Truman Doctrine. In essence, containment was 
going to make the world safe for democracy and, hopefully, 
win friends in the process. The policy was not totally an 
ideological one, however.
Due to the Communist challenge, "Americans began to 
realize that the security of Western Europe (and ultimately)
16
of the United States was threatened." Thus,
Fearing that Moscow might take over so much of 
the world as to make Soviet victory inevitable...
(the United States) decided that they would have 
to mount some sort of counteraction. They neither 
wanted total war nor felt ready to fight one.
(American policy) therefore had to improvise ways 
short of all-out fighting to halt the Soviet av­
alanche. 17
Under the influence of Acheson, and later Dulles, containment 
in one form or another, was to be the mainspring of American 
foreign policy in the years after World War II. While it was 
designed primarily for application in Europe, it was later 
used in Asia as well. The fact that it was not as successful 
in Asia served to complicate Canadian-American relations gen­
erally, in addition to Canadian-American interplay in Korea 
and Vietnam.
Canada had quite a different set of broad policy inter­
ests after World War II. While not as far-reaching or pre-
16
Ibid, p.30.
17
Ibid. p.30.
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else as those of the United States, Canada's Interests after 
the war also conditioned her foreign policy in later years.
As the post-war years progressed and as Russian attitu­
des grew increasingly obdurate, Canada had to resolve two 
dichotomous tasks: the concern with national identity or
independence in foreign policy and "the sober recognition of
18
the necessity for partnership with the United States." 
Because a  tntrl n r r n *  Iw .lT ""'FIT'W'l'i'i I ' i ' i . i l l , ;  lnumn n n b l  o v a d  ..
p0st-war years. Canada hgrnnir -rn
"--------- 19
war might become an enemy in the next." For Canada, one 
of the most distressing results of the Cold War was the un- 
envlable position of being sandwiched geographically between 
the two great antagonists, the United States and the TTGAR_ 
Thus, Canada's main policy concern would be the search for
security, globally in the United Nations and regionally in 
Inherent in this search was a desire not to see the 
two emerging superpowers engaged in all-out war. Thus, in 
the United Nations she would do all she could to relieve the 
tension of the Cold War, but, failing this, she felt she 
would be secure in the NATO alliance.
Springing from these conditions after Ubrld War II was
18
L.P.Singh, "Canada, The United States and Vietnam",
The Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.6, No.2, 
(WihfefTTgbBl-pnSS-l^y, p. 125.— s%e also D.-Baldwin, "The 
Myths of the Special Relationship", in 8 . Clarkson, ed..
An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada, (Toronto:l968).
19
l. vSpençer, .Canada in World Affairs 1946-1949. (Toronto 
1959) p.VII.
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a two-fold awareness on the part of Canadian policy-makers:
"a frank recognition that practically everything in inter­
national politics was of Interest to Canada, and a willing-
20
ness to accept responsibility." Because Canada became
increasingly aware of the growing East-West rift, and because
she had to alleviate its tension in hopes of preserving her
own security, she became "inextricably involved in the full
21
current of international affairs." Canada, therefore, would 
have to become positively involved in or engulfed by this 
current. In her efforts she realized the value of the United 
Nations as an effective Instrument for political involvement 
and NATO as an effective instrument for military security.
It is significant to note that, initially, these Canadian 
interests were primarily attuned to events in Europe. His­
torically and culturally this was natural. However, as ¥est- 
ern Europe slowly recovered, and was therefore less suscep- 
tible to the Communist threat, Canada found that the main 
danger to world peace lay in Asia. Thus, after 1950, when 
the Korean Crisis broke out, Canada's pursuit of early post­
war interests were focused more and more upon Asia.
Importantly, however, Canadian relations with Asia had 
never been as profound as they had been with Europe, and their
20
Ibid, p.2.
21
House of Commons Debates (Canada) 1948, Vol.IV, p.3428. 
He reafter referred to as Debates.
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growth had been gradual. Indeed, owing to the economic de­
pression, expansion of the Canadian diplomatic service was 
prevented, and this delayed an exchange of representatives 
with China until 1942. " To that time, and after, "fellow
members in the Commonwealth afforded Canada their most in-
23
timate connection with Asia." India was especially useful 
in this regard, and Pearson himself had said that India was
24
the wedge through which Canada gained its foothold in Asia.
Outside of India, however, Canadian-Asian relations had 
been slight. Indeed, by 1952 total trade even with India had
h.B.Pearson, "Canada and the Far Fast", United Asia,
Vol.4, 1952, p.37-40. There was, however, a legation in 
Tokyo as early as 1929. See G.P. de T.Glazebrook, A History
of Canadian External Relations, Vol.,II, (Toronto : 1 966) p.94.
23
Pearson, on. cit.. p.38.
24
See M.S.Rajan, "The Indo-Ganadian Entente", in Intern­
ational Journal, Vol.17, (Autumn: 1962) p.358-385, for an e:x- 
cellent survey of Indo-Canadian relations.
Uhile Indo^Canadian relations have, on the whole, been 
good, there ware points of friction. One such difficulty, 
perhaps the most important one, was the discriminatory Cana­
dian immigration policy which prevented many non-Europeans 
from entering Canada. This policy was an expression of the 
apprehension that many Canadians shared of indicrimlnateiy- 
lowering the barriers to oriental and non-white immigration.
Ostensibly the reason for this apprehension was the fear 
of cheap labor which would be produced with the influx of non- 
European immigrants. In reality, however, the policy expressed 
a desire to retain the racial balance in Canada, which in turn 
meant preserving the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon and French 
strains. Thus, by 1921, there was a wide gulf between the 
immigration policy in principle as formulated by Great Britain 
and public sentiment in Canada toward Chinese, Japanese, or 
"more embarrassingly British Indians." See P.H.Clyde, op.cit., 
p.474-475. Also Glazebrook, op.cit.. p.24-27, esp. p.25.
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amounted to only 283 million dollars (Can.). In 1966, 
however, Oanadian-Japanese trade alone amounted to over 330 
million dollars (Can.) and by 1969 it is expected to reach 
almost a billion dollars (Gan,), The figures in Appendices I 
and la, when contrasted with this estimate, go far in explain­
ing Canada’s turn to the East since 1945.
While there were purely political reasons for Canada’s
2o
Asian involvement from 1945, the Canadian commercial inter­
est played a large part. Because World War II brought the 
realization that Canada was a Pacific as well as an Atlantic 
power, she became concerned about the development and restor­
ation of trans-Pacific trade which would, according to
27
Pearson, greatly stimulate the development of Western Canada,
It must be remembered, however, that in the period under 
consideration, 1945-1968, Canadian immigration policies and 
restrictions, although net in accord with the general multi- 
racial aspect of the Commonwealth, were of little relative 
importance. Even the Canadian, and American, maltreatment 
of orientals during World War II did not affect in any sig- 
niflcant way policies to be discussed in this paper. The 
Canadian efforts to find a place for an independent India in 
the Commonwealth were thus much more beneficial to Indo- 
Oanadian relations in general than immigration and discrimi­
natory policies were harmful.
25
Pearson, op.cit.. p.38.
26
Canada was a member of the Par Eastern Commission, 
which was responsible for overseeing the terms of the Japan­
ese surrender. See Angus, op.cit., p.56-57.
27
Cited in W.E.C. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs.
1949 to 1950. (Toronto: 1957) p.l6?l,
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Since her trade with Japan and other Aslan countries, although
never great, had drastically curtailed during the war, Canada
was Interested In utilizing once more Japan’s primary product 
28
need, and in finding a market for her own finished goods 
in areas like Ceylon, Pakistan and India. China, too, offered 
great potential, and Canada’s huge grain sales to that coun­
try since 196I have had political significance as well as eco-
29
nomic benefits.-
It was obvious, however, that trade could not be con­
summated without peace and generally stable political condi­
tions in Asia. Thus, Canada was acutely interested in stav­
ing off the extension of the Cold War to Asia. However, with 
the results of the Chinese Civil War, Canada recognized that 
she would have to develop a genuine political interest in Asia, 
as well as an economic one. The fall of Chiang, who had been 
underwritten to a great degree by the United States, meant a 
de facto extension of the Cold War to Asia. Thus, it was in 
Canadian interests to pursue an avoidance of a hot war in Asia 
which might involve the United States, in addition to promot­
ing a peaceful political atmosphere in which to conduct trade.
A peaceful political atmosphere, however, was not enough 
in itself to encourage trade with the underdeveloped countries
28
See A.R.M. Lower, Canada and the far East - 1940, 
(New York:1940) esp. Chapter 5, and see also Appendix Ib,
29
See Appendix II.
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of Asia. A program of aid and technical assistance was also 
necessary. Thus, Canada embarked upon the Colombo flan In 
an attempt to better the economic viability, particularly of 
the Asian Commonwealth nations. The Colombo flan would pro­
vide an opportunity "to co-operate in working toward better
economic conditions through a program of capital development
30
and technical assistance." The.plan was not entirely tech­
nical, however, in that it would ultimately help to "establish
3 good and sound society that would have t h e n  o r al vigor and 
confidence to resist the Communist appeal." Significantly
Canadian membership in the plan was free of the taint of 
great power association and, as such, served as a remedial 
experiment in East-West relations. Because Canada was his­
torically unsoiled by imperialism, and, by virtue of her as­
sociation in the Colombo flan, was a Western country which 
appeared to show genuine concern for the Asian alight, her 
actions in Korea were much less suspect as those of the United 
States. In that regard at least, the Colombo flan had been 
of political as well as economic importance.
Canada's goal of a stable atmosphere has been made dif­
ficult by the American presence in Asia. While the United
30
Pearson, op.cit.. p.38. See Appendix III for Canadian 
contributions to the Colombo Plan.
31’
/3.3.Fierstead, Canada in World Affairs 1951-1953, 
(Toronto;1956) p.208.
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States also had Interests In Asia, these interests would not 
always coincide with Canadian aspirations. As a result there 
was a possibility that Oanadian-American relations in general 
could deteriorate due to the rather divergent views of Asia 
taken by the two countries. Such a possibility was inherent 
in the question of Communist Chinese recognition, which for 
the United States, became an important question of prestige, 
while for Canada, It was one of the barriers to increased in- 
dependenoe in foreign policy.
The fall of Nationalist China came as a rude awakening
32
to the American people but not the American government.
Because the idea of monolithic communism was prevalent at that 
time, Mao's victory was viewed as another Communist and thus 
Soviet expansion. The fact that the deposed leader, Chiang, 
had been supported largely by the United States, made his 
collapse even more shocking. More than that, however, the 
Nationalists' defeat pointed up a great power vacuum as far 
as the American government was concerned. This is not to deny 
that the state of China was still powerful in Asia; but sim­
ply that it was now a Communist power instead of one friendly 
to the United States. Previously, American policy had been 
predicated on the basis of a friendly, pro-West, China.
Now Chiang was gone, and China's new leader, Mao, proved ex­
tremely hostile to the United States. This fact coupled with
32
See below Chapter #.
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the already crumbling colonial system and the Korean War 
forced the United States into more active Asian involvement. 
The United States has had a long history of Asian in­
volvement in the Philippines, in extensive missionary acti­
vity and in substantial assistance programs. Theodore Roos­
evelt had predicted as much in 1901 when he said:
We stand supreme in a continent, in a hemisphere.
East and West we look across two great oceans to­
ward the larger world life in which....we must 
take an ever-increasing share. 33
Concern for the Russo-Japanese War, the "Gentleman's Agree­
ment" and the war in the Pacific,all before 1945, seem to 
bear out Roosevelt's feelings. After 1945 the l6 billion
dollars netted out in assistance to Asian countries show a
34
continuing Interest in that continent. Significantly, 
however, America's Asian involvement during these years 
tried to divorce itself from appearing to perpetuate the 
colonial system. Chiang's imminent collapse, however, made 
this pretended aloofness impossible, and the United States 
became more active in that civil war from 1946 to 1949. It 
was not until 1950 that the United States containment policy
33
Cited in Jules David's, America and the World of Our 
Time, (Hew York:i960) p.3.
34
See Appendix Iv. These figures indicate that while 
American private investment in Asia was not significant until 
i960, the record of official government loans and assistance 
was. Thus It appears that the American government,if not the 
private investor, had a growing interest in Asia after 1937 
and especially since 1958. See also China White Paper, op. 
cit. p.1006-1053, esp. pp.1043-1044.
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per ee became committed to Asia, occasioned by the outbreak 
of the Korean War.
It would be in light of the above, then, that Oanadian- 
American relations in Asia were to be conducted. Import­
antly, even in the early stages of involvement, the United 
States had always had a great deal more at stake in Asia, 
since she was a world power more by right and less by trans­
ient circumstance than Canada. The latter, while her inter­
ests were not minimal did not, and still does not, have as
much at stake. The Korean War served as the first test of
35
Oanadian-American mutual involvement in Asia, signalling 
a Canadian response to American initiatives that would be 
typical of her future Asian involvements. This was basic­
ally Canada's refusal to be committed entirely to American 
policy, and in that measure sacrifice what she considered 
indispensible policy objectives.
35
While the question of Communist Chinese recognition was 
chronologically first, its effect on Oanadian-American in­
terplay must be seen over a longer period of time, and will 
be dealt with in Chapter 5.
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CANADA, TEE UNITED STATES AND TEE 
KOREAN QUESTION 1945-1951
1
"Korea has been an Ill-fated peninsula," Its checker­
ed history has known domination by the Tartars, Mongols,
Japanese and Manchus periodically until the seventeenth cen- 
2
tury. In the twentieth century it has been the pawn of 
Japan, the Soviet Union and, more recently, the United Sta­
tes. Lying in the heart of the Far East, the peninsula has 
been called the dagger pointed at the heart of Japan, and for 
this reason became a part of the developing Japanese Empire, 
later to be known as the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
Korea's plight, never an enviable one, was worsened at the 
close of World War II,
The post-war problems of Korea, like so many of the other
nations of Asia, were the result of Japan's unconditional
3
surrender and the confused end of World War II, Trapped 
between the great Asian powers of China, Japan and Russia, 
the peninsula had obvious strategic importance in Asia speci-
1
Wilcox, op.cit.. p.44.
2
Shannon McCune, "The United States and Korea", in W. 
Thorpe ed.. The United States and the Far East. (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.; 1^52) P.t4-9t, P .7?.
Wilcox, op.cit., p.44 . 2 4 7 6 06
25
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fically, but also to the world. Thus, the Cairo Declaration
of 1 9 4 3 , signed by the Great Powers in anticipation of Japan's
fall and mindful of Korea's long domination, agreed that "in
4
due Course (she) shall become free and independent." Con­
sequently, Stalin and Roosevelt considered that the country 
could appropriately be administered by a multi-powered trus­
teeship in preparation for a future of full independence.
"The terms of the trusteeship or even the immediate future
5
of Korea occupied the statesmen but little", thus the for­
mula for independence was not worked out at this time. With 
the Japanese surrender in 1945, Korea once again became pro­
minent .
It should be remembered here that the Korean question 
did not warrant as much concern from the great powers as did 
the larger question of Japan's defeat. Moreover, the United 
States, and Canada, had both felt that the European theater 
of war was more important than the Pacific, and to that ex­
tent were immediately concerned with the German front. Only 
when the war in Europe was close to an end did the United 
States make a full turn to the East.
Canada, to the extent that she participated in the Paci­
fic Theater, was mainly concerned with a resumption of
4
McCune, op.cit., p.76.
5
L. Gordenker, The Peaceful Unification of Korea. The 
Hague, 1 9 5 9, p.3.
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6
Japanese trade. Thus, at the close of the war she was more 
interested in an equitable Japanese Peace Treaty to further 
that end, than in the Korean issue to which she was not even 
a party. From the beginning, then, it was apparent that Korea 
would theoretically occupy a more important place in American 
policy than in Canadian. This fact runs through the entire 
Korean issue, and it is well to note it now, for at no time 
was Canada proportionately as involved, committed, or inter­
ested in the Korean War per se than was the United States.
Logically, the end of World War II should have been the 
occasion for implementing theTCàlro Declaration. The accep­
tance of Japan's surrender, however, took priority. It was 
at this point that the division of Korea along the thirty-
eighth parallel was effected by Soviet and American troops,
7apparently for convenience and efficiency. At this time 
the Korean people were "assured that the purpose of the oc­
cupation was to enforce the instrument of surrender and to 
protect them in their personal and religious rights."^ The 
question of independence, however, was further clouded by 
the occupation forces until December, 1945 when the matter
6
See above Chapter II and Appendix Ib. See also Lower 
op.cit.. Chapter 5, and Angus op.cit.. Chapter 4, 6 and 7.
7
Thorpe, op.cit.. p.78.
8
Gordenker, op.cit.. p.4.
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was taken up at a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow.
It was here that the two occupying powers attempted to work 
out not only a solution to Korean independence, but to the 
resultant unification problem as well. Towards this end, 
the United States and the U.S.S.E. set up a Joint Commission 
for Korean settlement. Russian stubbornness, however, and 
an American reluctance to make use of her superior military 
power combined to bring the matter before the United Nations. 
According to American Ambassador Lovett, the United States 
"did not want to have the inability of two powers to reach 
agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims 
of the Korean people to independence."^
The United Nations struck hopeful aspirations from both 
the United States and Canada. It is useful here to see how 
both countries viewed the then still-:'-infant'! body for a bet­
ter understanding of events that follow.
There were few countries that had more reason than Ca­
nada to appreciate the "inseparable connection between in­
ternational organizations and (her) national interest.
Her difficult geographical position has already been mentioned, 
and this, along with her aversion to war, wase instrumental in
9
Ibid. p.l4.
10
E.H. Soward and E. Mclnnis, Canada and the United Nat­
ions. (New York:1956) p.VII.
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directing her to the United Nations, St, Laurent himself, 
in 1947, had said that "the best hope for mankind lies in 
the establishment of a world organization for the malntain- 
ance of p e a c e , a n d  it was this pursuit which was to dic­
tate policy there. She looked to the United Nations as an 
instrument through which nations could cooperate to remove
dangers of war and establish an orderly and peaceful com- 
1 2munlty. Indeed, the early post-war years seemed to nece­
ssitate such cooperation since there was a greater need,
through diplomacy, to reach a "modus vivendi with the Com- 
1 3munists." Aside from this there were other reasons why
Canada sought an effective world forum.
By 1948, Canada "was forced to realize that only oc­
casionally could her voice be influential in detailing mat-
14
ters of grand policy." This was made even more evident 
when she considered the effect of living next to the most 
powerful nation in the world. Thus, for Canada to attempt an 
independent approach to foreign policy, it was necessary to 
mitigate somewhat the overpowering influence of the United
11
Ibid. p.98.
12
Ibid. p.212.
13
Documents on the Korean Crisis. (Ottawa ;1951) p.9. 
Hereafter referred to as Documents. 1951.
14
Spencer, op.cit.. p.9.
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States, In the United Nations, theoretically if not funct­
ionally, Canada had an equal voice in world affairs. Simi­
larly, this voice would, to some degree, establish that 
Canada pursued her own foreign policy, rather than simply 
mimicking United States policy. Moreover, she knew she could 
not go it alone in any world crisis. The bald fact was, that 
for Canada, no major action was possible "if it did not have
the support of those who held the major share of the world's
15
military and economic power." There was a need for interna­
tional cooperation with the nations that mattered - the su­
perpowers. There was little point in Canada taking unlimited
action if those who had to carry the major portion of that
16
action were not in sympathy. She felt, moreover, that se­
curity lay in a firm structure of international organization.
In addition to the above, Canada accepted as a matter of 
course that war-time growth in power and stature (real or 
assumed) "required participation in the new international 
order which was being constructed with the United Nations as
17
a pivot." During the war Canada was content to be accept­
ed as a major participant, "without being required to under-
15
Statements and Speeches, No.47/2, January 13, 1947, p.8, 
Hereafter referred to as S/S.
16
Spencer, op.cit., p.7.
17
Ibid. p.2.
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take In the responsibility of sharing in the determination
18
of grand policy." Now all that had changed, and Canada, 
from pride, concern, and Interest, felt she should at least 
be a current in the stream of global affairs, for these rea­
sons, then, Canada both sought and valued United Nations mem­
bership.
Although there was no basic Oanadian-American divergence 
on United Nations' usefulness, the United States seemed to 
view that body differently. Collective security, while in 
principle extremely important for United States policy, was 
not the only advantage of the United Nations. A more hope­
ful consequence of membership would be the lightening of the
burden of American responsibility in global affairs. In con­
cert with other nations, American action in the United Nations 
would lend a moral justification to United States policy. The 
fact that submergence in an aggregate of nations would remove, 
to a certain degree, the opportunity for unilateral American 
action that was needed in the post-war years largely did not 
matter. Indeed, the idea that initiative itself was necessary 
was not then prominent.
These were the main Canadian and American concepts of the 
United Nations as formulated in 1945 and immediately after.
The decision to bring the Korean deadlock before that body
brought many of those concepts into play.
18
Ibid, p.2.
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At this point it may be well to remember that just as the 
Korean issue itself meant more to the United States than it 
did to Canada, the basic concept of the United Nations meant 
much more to Canada than to the United States, The United 
States post-war position was fairly well grounded upon econo­
mic and military realities and was, therefore, much less dep­
endent upon outside circumstances than that of Canada. All 
this had the effect of continually placing Canada in a posi­
tion where she would have to prove herself in the world com- 
munity. Thus, with the emergence of a re-vitalized Europe, 
Canada found herself in a more tenuous power position. More- 
over, because of the heightened volatility of the world situa­
tion due to Russia's, and much later China's, aquisition of 
nuclear weapons, Canada found herself drawn closer to the 
United Nations, and in utilizing that forum to encourage peace. 
The United States, it would seem, became increasingly disen­
chanted with the United Nations as she rose to the status of 
super-power. The situation would evolve, then, to a greater 
desire on Canada's part to uphold United Nations principles, 
while simultaneously trying to make American policy conform 
to world peace in general. In a word, the long time Canadian 
opportunity to influence the United States was now accompanied 
by a greater sense of responsibility for doing so. This ree- 
sponsibility was especially evident in the Korean situation.
Because of the American and Soviet deadlock, the thirty- 
eighth parallel evolved "from a line of military occupation to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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an artificial barrier to political and economic unity.
It was the task of the United Nations to try to ameliorate 
this division and "in due course" ensure the independence of 
Korea. In the General Assembly, the United States introduced 
a resolution to establish a United Nations Temporary Commis­
sion on Korea (UNTCOK) designed to "facilitate and expedite
a program for the attainment of national independence (for)
20
Korea and (the) withdrawal of occupation forces." The ve­
hicle for this program was to be universal elections in Korea 
(observed by UNTOOK) which would unify the country and arran­
ge for troop withdrawal. The United States also took the
liberty of naming the members to the Commission, of which
21
Canada was one. This was done, moreover, without prior 
consultation with many of the proposed members and Leon Gord­
enker suggests that "at least two delegations were taken by
22
surprise when (the American delegate) read his list."
Canada was one, but Gordenker adds that she did not reject 
the invitation out of hand apparently to save the United States
19
Ibid, p.89.
20
Debates, 1949, Vol.II, p.l604-l605.
21
The others were Australia, China, France, El Salvador, 
India, The Philippines, Syria and the Ukranian SSR.
22
Gordenker, op.cit.. p.3l .
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embarrassment.
This American action is rather significant in Oanadian-
American relations. It suggests that the United States was
firmly convinced that, besides being sympathetic on the Korean
issue, Canada could be relied upon to take a view close to
that of the United States in the matter. Indeed, the whole
commission was set up so that "a majority of its members could
be expected to favor or at least not sharply oppose United
24
States policy." The United States had, to a great degree, 
taken Canada for granted In naming her to the commission.
This action was not wholly based on unwarranted assump^ 
tiens, however. A combined war effort, similar cultural and 
historical heritages, and close policy outlooks regarding the 
Communist threat were all prevalent. Their broad policies 
were also similar regarding the need for security and peace 
in volatile areas. The only difference was that the United 
States overestimated the extent to which it could go regard­
ing Canadian action. The notion that because ultimate policy 
aims were similar, agreement on tactics would necessarily 
follow proved to be false. The Canadian feeling that the 
United Nations was too important a body to be made into a 
super-power play was underestimated. Because of this mistaken
23
Ibid. p.31.
24
Ibid. p.31.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
assumption an understanding of future Canadian positions would 
be difficult.
What was also apparent in the choice of Canada was the 
lack of diplomatic skill on the part of the United States.
What may have been condoned in the backrooms of Yalta and 
Potsdam could not be considered useful when dealing in an 
open world forum like the United Nations. What may have been 
expedient in dealings with South American "puppet" regimes, 
conceivably would not be correct when dealing with a country 
which at that time fancied herself as a prominent power.
This stroke, understandable as it was in view of the limited 
American diplomatic activity, was obviously an extension of in­
tracontinental diplomacy onto an international level. While 
this nomination had a certain grounding in logic, similar 
American moves in the future would not prove as expedient.
This time, however, Canada was not averse to membership on 
UNTOOK.
Canada, although diplomatically snubbed, looked upon 
UNTCOK membership both as an opportunity to try to influence 
the course of the United Nations and to mitigate tension in 
a potential trouble spot. She would also be taking an active 
part in the United Nations and to that extent be furthering 
her goal of implementing a successful international organiza­
tion. Another element in her decision was the fact that 
Canada, being ultimately dependent upon the United States, 
did in fact want to please her. In reality, membership on
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the commission was not such a hitter pill to swallow, and it 
could be valuable. In a word, it was just as easy as not to 
accept UNTOOK membership. That is what Canada did although 
she, like most other countries, was ignorant as to how far 
the situation would go.
The idea of a temporary commission to study and advise 
on the possibility of elections in Korea was accepted by most 
of the United Nations membership with the exception of Russia 
and the Soviet bloc countries. The very existence of a com- 
mlssion suggests that the United Nations had "developed a 
special political instrument for use in troubled areas where 
solutions are elusive but where the danger of spreading con-
..25fllct is never distant. Pearson himself had said that the 
"expression of the Korean people for unity, on which (the
26
General Assembly) agrees, does not seem to be necessary."
The root of the problem, however, proved to be the dif- 
flculty of the commission's access to North Korea. American 
military officials were more in sympathy with UNTCOK's work, 
obviously because it was American sponsored. The Soviets, 
however, had advocated complete military withdrawal prior to 
any elections and thus would not support the commission's 
aims. Indeed, even the Ukranian SSR had refused to serve
25
Ibid. p.VII.
26
Spencer, op.cit.. p.90.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
on UNTCOK. Moreover, formulas for "democratic" elections 
were ostensibly different in the American and Russian views. 
Russian uncooperativeness was, in the final analysis, the 
main reason why the United States sponsored a second reso­
lution calling for supervision of elections in Korea in such
areas as were assessable to it. It was this second resolu-
?7tion which brought Canadian action.“
The second resolution, though reasonable from the Ameri­
can point of view, was not endorsed initially by Canada.
Her reasons, put forth by St. Laurent, were substantial and 
were based on legal as well as political grounds.
By virtue of the second resolution, the Temporary Com­
mission had been authorized to supervise elections in the
whole of Korea but "was not authorized to act in the South 
26
alone." The Interim Committee’s decision to "implement
29
the program in such areas as are accessable to it," would,
27
The American decision calling for the second resolution 
was also conditioned by other factors. One was the war-weary 
attitude of the American people. Cries of "bring the boys 
home" were prevalent during much of the Commission's work.
Also, the fact that support of troops in South Korea, as well 
as of the government itself, proved to be such an expensive 
proposition that it tended to convince the American government 
that it was in their best interests to facilitate a quick set­
tlement of the Korean question.
28
Debates, 1948, p.1075-1076.
29
Ibid. p.1075-1076. The Interim Committee was a body set 
up to do the work of the General Assembly since the latter 
was too unwieldy for continuous consultation. As will be seen, 
the Committee itself proved to be a point of friction for the 
Canadian Delegation.
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according to St, Laurent, be overstepping the bounds of the 
commission's authority. Its action could not, therefore, "be 
brought within the terms of reference....as laid down by the 
General Assembly." Thus, said St. Laurent, UNTCOK was not 
empowered to act in the South alone. Nor could the Interim 
Committee itself change the terms of reference. Indeed, 
such a change could only be effected by the General Assembly. 
In this vein, election supervision in the South was illegal. 
The question involved more than legalities, however, in that 
there were also political considerations.
While the constitutional repercussions of the second 
Resolution were significant, the Canadian delegation also 
"appreciated the fact that Korea was a danger spot and that
to hold elections in the South alone would amount, in fact,
31
to a partition. Such an election would, moreover, institu­
tionalize the decision in Korea to such an extent that ulti­
mate unification would prove impossible. The division would 
also create ^  facto a government under the wardship of the 
United Nations. Such a situation would, it was felt, "in-- 
volve the organization in police or administrative commitments
which the United Nations could not fulfill in the absence of
32
military force" —  a military force which Canada at that
30
Ibid. p.2075-2076. X
31
Spencer, op.cit.. p.105-111.
32
Ibid, p.111.
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time did not believe advantageous.
For Canada, the Implications of the Second resolution 
were great. They would, in effect, remove the responsibili­
ty of the United States occupation and place it in the hands 
of the United Nations. More than any other power which was 
willing to deal with Korea through the United Nations, the
United States had direct involvement there —  basically the
33
United States program was to shake off those ties. If 
this was in fact the United States’ intention it would seem 
to bear out Canadian fears about the United Nations becoming 
a tool of the superpowers. While Canada’s attitude would at 
least silence Russian allégations that UNTCOK was in the ser­
vice of the United States, attitude alone would not alleviate 
34
the situation.
The Korean issue in the United Nations boiled down to a
question of the Interim Committed^ reaction to the United
35
States ëecond resolution. If, as Pearson suggested, it 
should be taken as advice, then it would be just a matter of 
time before the matter could conceivably be worked out in the
33
Gordenker, opScit.. p.84.
34
Ibid, p.73. For St. Laurent’s and Pearson’is views see 
Harrison, op.cit.. Chapters 7 and 8.
55
See Denis Stairs, ’Confronting Uncle Sam; Cuba and 
Korea", in Clarkson, op.cit.. p.57-68.
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General Assembly. However, if the Committee accepted the
■second resolution without question there would be, in St.
Laurent's words, "a new and serious situation created which
would have to be taken into consideration by the governments
who are members of the Commission, and who feel that the ad-
36
vice from this Committee is unwise and unconstitutional."
Denis Stairs suggests that if "this was a threat that Canada
would withdraw from UNTCOK if the Americans had their way,
then in terms of the usual Canadian subservience it was a
37
bold stroke indeed." However, the threat, if it was one, 
proved to be unheeded.
The Canadian insistence in maintaining the formal machi­
nery of a duly constituted United Nations organ was the overt 
expression of her high aspirations for the organization it­
self. Basically what she saw in Korea was a potentially dan­
gerous situation which could only be exacerbated by the im­
plementation of the Second Resolution. Her insistence on the 
formal machinery, then, was a public attempt to influence 
American policy in the United Nations. As will be seen, this 
attempt was largely unsuccessful but that failure did serve 
to reinforce her faith in quiet diplomacy.
On the Korean issue in the United Nations and later when
36
Debates, 1948, p.1075.
37
Stairs, op.cit.. p.65.
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hostilities broke out, it was apparent that open diplomacy, 
on a question about which the United States was truculent, 
was largely useless. This lesson seems to have been learned 
in view of Canadian action concerning Vietnam and on the 
Chinese recognition question. Hereafter only when there was 
imminent world danger would Canada voice her critical con­
cern about United States policy. As will be seen, vocifer­
ous Canadian reaction to United States policy would serve only 
to embarrass Canada. Outspoken concern would be expressed, 
therefore, only on issues that were immediate and potentially 
dangerous, while quiet diplomacy would be used mainly on 
issues that were of relatively minor importance, or in cases 
where a loss of face far outweighed positive benefits. This 
is not to say that quiet diplomacy would never be used on 
major issues, but that when it was, it was usually accompan- 
ied by a major Canadian policy statement for public consump- 
tion, which served to lend gravity to Canada’s position.
When the Interim Committee met, Patterson, the Canadian 
representative, had already been advised by his government 
"not to accept the advice given in the Becond resolution or
38
associate himself with the election....in South Korea alone." 
However, Patterson was not present at the meeting when the 
decision was taken to implement the Second Resolution. That 
decision touched-off an already sensitive Canadian government.
38
Debates 1948, p.1075-1076.
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"If the commission were to proceed in this matter",
said St. Laurent, "its impartiality and authority as a pro-
39
perly constituted commission would he undermined," The
overtones of the decision to implement the resolution indeed
seemed lugubrious. The reasoning for such a decision was
anything but constitutional, especially since it had come so
soon after receiving word from the Interim Committee. In the
words of the Secretary to UNTCOK,
The two main reasons for making the announcement 
as soon as possible were firstly that it was de- 
sireable to avoid delay concerning a final date 
for the election, and secondly that a public an­
nouncement of some sort (was) expected in connec- 
tion with the celebration of the Korean indepen­
dence day on the first of March. It was hoped 
that the public announcement from the commission 
might have a quieting effect on threatening riots. 40
When informed of this, Patterson "regretted that the tempora­
ry commission had made a number of public statements to the
effect that it had made up its mind (concerning the elec-^
41
tlonâ). Indeed, General Hodge, Military commander of the 
occupation in the South, had said that the elections had been 
cleared with the proper authorities. However, in Patterson’s 
view, the commission’s vote was not legal and Hodge’s state­
ments were "either misleading or based on a misunderstand-
39
Ibid. 1948, p.2452-2453.
40
Gordenker, op.cit.. p.76.
41
Ibid, p.77. See also Stairs, op.cit., p.64-68.
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Ing.” When the commission could not clarify the state­
ments made by Hodge, Patterson temporarily walked out. When 
a formal vote was taken upon his return, an official state­
ment, issued by the commission, declared that they were still 
considering action on Implementing the second resolution.
By this action it would seem that temporarily at least Cana­
da had won, and that her cry of "foul" was heard in Washington, 
This exchange between an obviously American dominated commis­
sion and the Canadian Delegation was significant because it 
pointed up the degree to which Canada was able to influence 
the United States. The results can be misleading, however.
The Korean affair in the United Dations suggests the 
modifying influence of Canada upon the United States. Un­
able to ostensibly alter grand American policy, Canada chose 
to influence it in in a legal manner. While the change would 
admittedly be minor, it did serve to illustrate Canadian 
stubbornness. Canada obviously did feel that larger issues 
were at stake, but only on this point could she get her way. 
Quiet diplomacy here was not enough and, to emphasize what 
she felt were significant implications for future United 
Dations policy, she came out publicly and criticized the 
commission's proposed actions.
The United States reaction was also significant, Canada 
did have a point and it was a valid one. In this sense it
42
Gordenker, op.oit., p.77.
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is not too much to placate a friend over something that really 
was never in very much doubt. Basically, there was no point 
in alienating Canada over an issue which would ultimately go 
your own way. While a compliance to Canadian demands would 
not affect the whole scope of Korean activity in the United 
Dations, it did seem to be a point on which Canada was ada«. 
maht. American stubbornness, moreover, might look as though 
the United States was trying to run roughshod over a United 
Dations commission. In this light one could easily concede 
Canada the battle knowing one would win the war. It was, 
however, another Instance of American brashness and lack of 
tact, although it did point up the Canadian response to an 
American policy which she felt unwise. In the end, however, 
Canada’s "victory" was short-lived and the "unconstitutional" 
decision was legally formalized. The American government was 
firm on the important issue of having elections, if not on 
the less important formula for effecting them.
Since formal procedures were followed on ÜKTCOK, Canada 
had made headway. Ultimately, however, she had not been able 
to influence American policy in the United Dations. It was 
doubtful that anyone at this time could have prevented the 
United States from extricating itself from Korea, The occu­
pation itself had proved troublesome from the beginning, dlf-
43
ficult to supply and strategically questionable." There
43
Loo, cit.. p.87.
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was also the possibility that there might be skirmishes with 
the Russians; a possibility that was pregnant with danger- 
ous overtones. In a word, the United States was determined
to get out of Korea. With Canada’s consent or without it, 
this is what she did. Canada’s action had the tangible re­
sult of adding legality to that predetermination.
Although she had been snubbed, Canada was not about to 
bite off her nose to spite her face. Her interests and po­
sition in the United Nations conceivably took precedence over
diplomatic setbacks, and to that extent Canada took part in
44
the commission's activity. It was obvious that even though 
UNTOOK had practically abandoned the aim of unification bef­
ore or through a national election, Canada had not lost all 
hope. She would, by continuing to serve on it make the best 
of an admittedly bad situation. Her initial fears however 
were justified. Doubtless the thirty-eighth parallel had 
been institutionalized. With the outbreak of the Korean War, 
this political border became a military one as well,
The foregoing discussion of Canadian-Amerlean activity 
in the United Nations has shown how far Canada would go once
44
The difficulty on the commission, however, seems to have 
made Canada somewhat hesitant about robust service. Thus, when 
the Ukranian SSR chose to step down from UNTOOK because of the 
decision to go ahead with elections in the South, Canada took 
this opportunity to do the same, saying that she did not want 
to offset the commission’s balance. See Gordenker, ibid, p,70- 
138, also Stairs, op,cit.. p,65-68 and Harrison, op.cit..
p.111,
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she knew the trend of American policy. The fact that she ran 
directly counter to dhat policy proved she would go to some 
lengths in situations that were of potential but not immed­
iate danger. In the end she followed American policy, even 
though she had been overruled by American domestic consider­
ations, notably a Presidential election. Canadian action 
during the Korean War, however, was taken not for fear of po- 
tential danger but immediate danger —  in that situation 
Canada was considerably more vehement.
The Korean War for the United States served as the first 
test of a European orientated containment policy, as well as 
America's introduction to the limited war. From the develop­
ment of the Atomic bomb, until Korea, "American foreign po­
licy was based on the assumption that any war would be a to-
45
tal war waged largely with nuclear weapons." However, the 
dismissal of one of America's greatest war heroes in MacArthur 
and the overwhelming defeat of the Democrats in 1952 suggest 
that the United States was unprepared for Korea and the lim- 
ited war.
For Canada, too, Korea was significant. She had, for the 
first time committed her forces to the United Nations in what 
would prove to be peacekeeping operations. These operations, 
moreover, were to serve a double purpose; alleviation of hos­
tilities and upholding the authority of the United Nations,
45
A. Gutteman, Korea and the Theory of Limited War. 
(Boston;1967) p.1.
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With this in mind we must view Canada’s action in an Ameri­
can dominated Korean War as a gauge of how much support she 
would give United States policy in a conflict that drew many 
countries close to the brink of World War III.
In an important speech before the National Press Club 
then Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined the Par Eastern
defense perimeter of the United States, Missing from that
46
perimeter were Korea and the island of Taiwan, "So far as 
the military security of these areas are concerned," said 
Acheson,
it must be clear that no person can guarantee 
these areas against military attack. But it 
must (also) be clear that no guarantee is hard­
ly sensible or necessary within the realm of 
practical relationship.
"Should such an attack occur," he went on,
the initial reliance must be on the people at­
tacked to resist it and then upon the commit­
ments of the entire civilized world under the 
Charter of the United Nations (to resist it). 47
While Acheson’s remarks were also concerned with the
Chinese civil war, his statement did give the impression that
the defense of South Korea would be up to the South Koreans
themselves. Failing this, the responsibility would then be
assumed by the United Nations,
Because the United Nations had chartered South Korea, it
was reasonable to assume that it should come to Korea’s de-
46
See below Chapter §.
47
Guttman, op.cit,. p.111-118.
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fenae,If It became necessary. This rationale was, In effect
48
the same shared by Canada, which, for the reasons cited above,
had been fearful of just such a situation. What proved to be
Canadian providence was borne out when, in June 1950, North
Korea attacked and overwhelmed a lightly manned South Korean
army. Acheson's statement, provident or not, was similarly
borne out by subsequent United Nations action.
The United States, by 1950, bad taken measures to dras-
tically reduce the American military establishment in Korea,
in addition to the rest of the area generally. Indeed "Japan
was garrisoned by a skeleton force of four divisions and
these....were reduced to 70^ of strength by defense econo*
49
mies." Korea itself, moreover, in a measure to assure that 
"(they) might not be tempted to embarrass Washington by a 
march northwards, were given little in the way of military
.50
aid," Small wonder then, with obvious military inferiority
and what seemed a tacit refusal of American support. South 
Korea was attacked. The American government, however, in 
spite of previous pronouncements, chose to defend the South 
Korean government.
48
See above p, 38-41,
49
G, Hudson, The Hard and Bitter Peace. (New York:1967) 
p.81, "To prevent the South Koreans from attacking" said Gen­
eral Roberts,"we gave them no combat air force or tanks or 
heavy artillery." Same, p.8 l,
50
Ibid, p.8 1 ,
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The United Nations Security Council, at the behest of
the United States, issued a June 25 resolution calling "upon
the invading troops to cease hostilities and withdraw back
„51
to the thirty-eighth parallel. Two days later, the Coun­
cil issued another resolution recommending that the members 
of the United Nations "furnish such assistance to the Bepu-
52
bllc of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack." 
With these two resolutions the Korean War became, in addition 
to a United States problem, one for the United Nations. The 
significance of this action cannot be overestimated.
Because the United Nations had assisted in the creation 
of the new republic, and had kept its commission in Korea at 
the request of Syngman Ehee, this act of North Korean aggres­
sion could be construed as a challenge to the organization 
itself. The North Korean attack had turned the United Na­
tions from an exponent of collective security to an actor in 
collective security. United States interests there were also 
in jeopardy as were those of Canada, The latter obviously 
did not want to see a war in Asia, but she did not want to 
see the work and the ideals of the United Nations compromised 
either. Accordingly, Canada found herself committed both in 
principle and, later militarily, to war-like action in Korea, 
under the auspices of the United Nations,
51
B. Rees, Korea. The Limited War, (London:1964), p,110-
114.
52
Guttman, op.cit.. p.1-9.
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At this point Canada was in agreement with both the ac­
tion of the United Nations and initial American policy.
Truman, on June 25, had sent the Seventh Fleet to patrol the 
Formosa Strait to prevent a possible extension of the hos* 
t m t i e s  to that island. He was certain, moreover, that if 
South Korea were allowed to fall, communist leaders would then 
be emboldened to override nations closer to the United States, 
and quite possibly draw the world into another war. This was 
done prior to the first Security Council Resolution. However, 
acting on the justification of the second resolution, Truman
authorized General MacArthur, "to send to Korea combat units
54
drawn from the American army of occupation in Japan. With
that action the United States unilaterally entered the war
before the United Nations could muster the wherewithal to im-
plement the second Security Council Resolution. Canada was
in agreement with these policies since, said Pearson, they
"represented collective action through the United Nations for 
55
peace." At this stage Canada felt American and United Na­
tions policy complementary, and did not object to the United 
States’ move: indeed, Pearson defended it.
53
Harry Truman, Memoirs Vol.II Years of Trial and Hope. 
(New York:1956) p,333.
54
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55
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At this point it must be remembered that Canada looked 
at the Korean War on June 17, 1950 purely in terms of de­
fense action. Even though there were hostilities there was 
no fear that the war would be expanded. Agreement with Uni­
ted States policy was entirely justifiable, in terms of re­
ference of the war. This attitude changed, as we shall see 
later upon China's entrance, but it is well to note that the 
situation in late June of 1950 in no way resenbled the situ- 
ation when China entered the war.
"An act of aggression," said Pearson, "will be met by 
the dispatch of forces put at the disposal of the Security
Council by member governments as the result of prior agree- 
56
ments." However, he continued,
because agreement (on the forces to be put at the 
disposal of the Council) had proved technically 
impossible, the responsibility for checking ag­
gression had to be shouldered by individual mem­
bers of the Council acting within the terms of 
the Charter but on their own initiative. 57
Significantly, Canadian approval had been given in terms of
United Nations action, and not as an endorsement of American
policy per se. This aspect would come into play later during
MacArthur'8 push to the Yalu when, again with reference to
the United Nations, Canada grew wary of American military
leadership,
Canada's official reaction to the Korean hostilities
56
Cited in Ibid, p,9.
57
Ibid. p.9-10.
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has been expressed by Lester Pearson, Although she could
not be expected to play as Important a role as the United
States, yet Canada's job was
to play a part, a part determined by herself
but worked out in consultation with (her) 
friends in the collective efforts of the free 
countries to prevent aggression if possible 
by showing that it cannot succeed, or to pre­
vent it if it does. 58
Pearson's statement had a twofold effect. He was re­
emphasizing the limited objectives of the war, and stressing 
the need for consultation among United Nations participants. 
Such consultation was to prove necessary for, in less than 
two months, the first half of the General Assembly resolu­
tion had been accomplished; the invader had been repulsed.
The question now was whether to cross the thirty-eighth par­
allel and, if so, the extent to which the aggressor should
be pursued.
The Canadian attitude, upon completion of the first half 
of the General Assembly Resolution, indicated an agreement 
with United Nations proposals to push across the thirty-
eighth parallel. Speaking in the United Nations, Pearson
expressed the hope that North Korea would lay down their arms,
thus curtailing any more open conflict. If they did not do
this, however, the United Nations should
leave its forces free to do whatever is prac­
ticable to make certain that the communist ag-
58
Harrison, op.cit.. p.282.
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gressors of North Korea are not permitted to
establish some new base In the peninsula from 
which they could sally forth again upon a 
peaceful people. 59
In this respect the Canadian attitude was similar to that of 
MacArthur, who felt that a foray into North Korea was a sine 
qua non for complete victory. Canada did have reservations 
about the crossing, however.
"Nothing should be done", said Pearson in the establish­
ment of a unified free Korea which carries any menace to
60
Korea’s neighbors."
Nothing must be done (he added) which holds 
the least suggestion that any member of the
United Nations has any purpose in Korea other 
than to establish that country under the full 
sovereignty of its own people. 61
It was obvious that the crossing of the thirty-eighth paral­
lel had political as well as military significance for Canada 
even at this early stage. Indeed,Canada had even "proposed 
sending a mission which would have been the last appeal to 
the North Koreans (to surrender) before the line (was) cros-
62
sed." Similarly, endorsement of the United Nations authori-
59
Documents, 1952, p.2,
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zation to cross the parallel was given only after Canada was 
convinced such a move "might not result in a rush for the 
Manchurian or Russian border." To further lessen the ten­
sion conducive to a Chinese entrance, the Canadian govern­
ment had even proposed a defensive line across the narrow
waist of North Korea to serve as a "kind of unoccunied fron- 
64
tier area." In a word, the Canadian government, though in
basic agreement with the first crossing, "felt that very
great care should be taken to avoid offering any unecessary
65
provocation to the Chinese government at Peking."
The single most important unknown factor in the first 
crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel was the attitude of 
Peking. The enigma was solved when Communist China crossed 
the Yalu. By their action, it was obvious that, the crossing 
of the thirty-eighth parallel and the steady advancement of 
United Nations forces to the Chinese border was considered 
by Mao to be a threat to China’s security.
It is important to note, however, that during the United 
Nations decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel, the 
Chinese government had made their views known. Chou En-lai 
had said, on September 30, 1950, that the "Chinese people,...
63
Ibid. 1951, p.1442-1444.
64
Ibid. 1951, p.55.
65
Ibid. 1951, p.55.
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will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being sa-
66
vagely Invaded by the Imperialists," Moreover, on October
2, he had formally notified the Indian Ambassador, K.M.
Panikkar that, "American intrusion into North Korea would en-
67
counter Chinese resistance," This attitude must have been 
in Pearson’s mind as he warned against provoking the Chinese, 
The Ottawa-New Delhi link was apparently utilized on this oc­
casion even though Canada ultimately acquiesed to United 
States policy. The American government, however, did not take 
Panikkar seriously.
Truman, writing of the incident in his "Memoirs" felt
that
Mr, Panikkar had in the past played the game of
the Chinese Communists (so) regularly that
his warning could not be taken as that of an 
observer. 6 8
The United States was also convinced that the Chinese warn-
ing was merely a ploy to prevent the United Nations autho­
rization to cross the parallel, possibly hoping to blackmail
69
it by threatening intervention. There was, moreover, con­
tinuing domestic pressure to extend the war and accept nothing
66
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67
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less than total victory. The popularity of General Mac­
Arthur was evident in this, in addition to a revitalized 
Republican Party which was continually criticizing the lim­
ited war.
It is apparent in Canadian activity, at this time that 
although there was a danger of Chinese entrance, it was not 
considered so imminent that Canada should disavow either the 
United Nations resolution or the American government’s desire 
to cross the thirty-eighth parallel. It was likely that she 
was also thinking about the original United Nations desire 
to see a free and independent Korea, once again unified. As 
long as this objective was compatible with United Nation and 
American desires, it was a proper course for Canada to follow 
also, even though New Delhi had cautioned against it. Basic­
ally, there was a justification in endorsing American and 
United Nations policy, even if that policy did offer a pos­
sibility for Chinese entrance. ' Ifhen Chinese entrance was 
forthcoming, however, Korea became "an entirely new war" and 
Canada's attitude changed considerably.
The invasion by Chinese troops said Pearson, had pushed
70
Korea to the mouth of a rumbling volcano. What had origi­
nally been latent fears, were now of foremost concern for 
Canada. The risk of a major war "transcended immeasureably
70
Documents, 1952, p.60.
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71
all other questions," and Canada's desire now was for a ce­
ssation of hostilities. It was also apparent that the uni­
fication of Korea was not, at this time, as important. Spea­
king in the Commons, Pearson felt that it was not the obliga­
tion of the United Nations to unify Korea by force but to "do
72
everything (they could) to bring about that unity." "At
the moment," he maintained, "the focus of our hopes and fears
is....to find a solution to the grave and menacing problem
73
that has arisen in Korea," That problem was to "do every­
thing within the power of statesmanship to prevent the Korean
74
War from becoming a war with China." In this vein, Canada 
pressed for negotiations.
"We should try to begin negotiations with the Chinese Com­
munists", asserted Pearson, "If and when the military situation
75
is stabilized." In his view, "nothing should be left undone
which might conceivably result in an honorable and peaceful
76
settlement in Korea." Thus, when there appeared to be a
71
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military stalemate at the thirty-eighth parallel, Canada
pressed to take advantage of a "kind of cease-fire" and open 
77
negotiations. It was clear that with the Chinese entrance
Canada became deeply concerned about the possibility of World
III. This concern was heightened by Truman's apparently
casual reference to the use of atomic weapons.
When asked about the possible use of the atomic bomb.
President Truman replied that "there (had) always been active
78
consideration of nuclear weapons." Pearson, in a nation­
wide broadcast, warned that "the fate of the whole world would
79
be jeopardized by such weapons." The atomic bomb, moreover, 
was not just another weapon, but one which was capable of 
destroying all life on earth. He urged that any decision per­
taining to its use be taken in concert with allies and not as 
a unilateral act. "The atomic bomb is universally regarded
as the ultimate weapon" concluded Pearson. "It should be
80
treated as such."
Whether it was Truman's reference to the ultimate weapon,
81
or a combination of a number of other factors, Korea ceased
77
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to be a hot war shortly after January 1952. Canada's action 
during the hostilities was significant,
Canada had accepted, in many respects, the main lines of
United States policy. It is imnnrt&mtmmhowPveBv'
so usually wit^ g thmt, ni\ch policy was in agreement
with United Nations activity.^She could, almost throughout 
the crisis, find a justification for her action in terms other
than American goals. Thus, to the extent that American po­
licy was compatible wilh her own goals she would for the sake 
of friendship, as well as interests, go along with these aims 
and subsequent means to attain them. However, it was one
thing to consent to grand policy, but quite another to risk
a~major war. Thus when the possibility of war wixn China or 
the use" oI TrU'clear weapons seemed imminent Canada could not 
accede to American policy. The fact that the United States 
was not prepared to go to war with China, while significant, 
does not alter the fact that Canada came out strongly oppos­
ed to an extension of hostilities beyond Korea, Basically, 
through her action in the Korean hostilities Canada proved 
that when the situation demanded it she could express an op­
inion of her own regardless of American policy. This was 
also the case in the United Nations before hostilities broke 
out, when Canada had refused to allow the United States to 
make unilateral policy for the entire organization. The ex­
tent to which Canada was successful was not so much a measure 
of American influence, or lack of it, but rather of Canadian
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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determination not to see World War III. It was also this 
determination which prompted her action during the Korean 
hostilities, and it will he seen again, though somewhat dif­
ferently, in the Vietnam situation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IV
CANADA, TEE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM
1954-1966
Canadlan-American interplay in Vietnam has been condi­
tioned by four main factors since the Geneva Accords of 1954. 
These are Canada’s difficult rolesoon the I08C, her desire for 
a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia, direct American mili­
tary involvement in Vietnam and the letter’s attitude toward 
containment of Communism. It is around these four areas that 
our discussion of Canadian-American interplay will revolve, 
since they are the main points of friction and/or coopera­
tion between Canada and the United States in Vietnam. From 
this discussion it will be seen that, similar to the Korean 
War, Canadian policy has been compatible and, at times, com- 
plimentary to American policy, but only insofar as her own 
sense of self-interest and security were not visibly threat- 
ened.
■ Canada’s role on the lOSO was a direct result of the
Geneva Conference of 1954 on Korea and Indochina. Basically, 
the lose was a three-member commission comprised of India, 
Poland and Canada, its main purpose being to supervise both 
the implementation of the cease-fire in Indochina, and the 
possibility of elections in Vietnam. Importantly, the com­
mission was given the responsibility for such supervision,
61
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but no direct power with which to effect it. It was the role 
of the 1080 to oversee and advise, but nothing more. The 
combatting parties, France and the Yiet-minh, were largely 
on their honor to implement the decisions of the Geneva Con­
ventions, most of which pertained to the cessation of hos­
tilities. The main purpose of the Accords, it should be re- 
membered. were military in scone and initially dealt little
o  , - - A +  +\ç, r. 4- ' r-  ^ riUii. 4 ,. . ^ ,  ,   .
ed France an easy way out of an embarrawwi no- war, and for _f.b 
Reason were notoriously short-sighted. Thus, Canada’s ini­
tial position on the 1080 offered h<2r little hope of real­
izing the expectations of the Geneva Conference, as well as 
her own, and a great possibility for less than substantial 
participation. Moreover, she did not at first even expect to 
be a part of the conference on Indochina.
It was as a participant in the Korean discussions that 
Canada found herself at Geneva, since she had been Involved 
in the Korean hostilities. Because she had had no direct in­
volvement in Indochina at the time, Canada was not particu*- 
larly interested in the Indochina settlement. Her interest
came more by way of a general "desire to prevent the resump-
1
tion of hostilities in the region," than anything else. Her
1
Pacificus, "Canada in Indochina", International Jour­
nal . (Autumn:1 9 5 6 ) Vol.II, No.4, p.270-278, p.271.
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reaction to Indochina was basically the same as her earlier 
reaction to Korea in that since 1945 Canada "moved to a franl
recognition that instability anywhere menaced her own in*-
2
tèrests." This is not to say that Canada's interest in Indo­
china was haphazard, but only that it was not as great as 
other parties, France, the 7iet-mihh, the United States, who 
had more at stake in the Indochina settlement. Pearson's 
policy in 1954 was "to avoid....involvement in any specific 
commitments for which the (Canadian) delegation did not have 
a mandate. Thus, it was felt that the Canadian role should 
be less than active, but more than disengaged. Indeed, she 
took pains to "avoid any appearance or attitude of indiffer­
ence to developments, the consequence of which (should) they
deteriorate into conflict, would certainly concern and (maybe)
4
involve Canada."
Canada's role evolved, therefore, as "an unobstrusive 
5
oil-can in the proceedings, owing in large part to the es­
teem in which the Canadian delegation was held. Pearson, it 
seems, "was highly respected and on good terms with Bedell
2
Ibid. p.178.
3
L.B. Pearson, S/8 54/30.
4
J, Holmes, "Geneva;1954," International Journal, (Sum­
mer; 1967) Vol.22, No.3, p.457-484, p.464.
5
Ibid, p,46l.
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6
Smith, Bidault and even Molotov," and "Chester Banning was
7
able to speak (fluently) with Chou En-lai," Thus, the rap­
port which Canada enjoyed with a wide variety of parties 
did as much to ensure Canada's position on the commission as 
did the fact that she was a member of the Western Bloc, The 
other two members were non-aligned and pro-communist. There 
was, thus, a need for a Western voice on the ICSC. Canada's 
position was, therefore, a logical one, both for herself and 
the United States, even if it had come in a roundabout way.
The work of the commission. Insofar as concerned the 
prevention of hostilities, was successful. However, the 
"troika principle - behind the composition of the commission
indicated that Canada was there to protect the interests of
8
the West, or to be more specific, of the United States." 
Canada's place on the ICSC, therefore, offered her at once a 
potentially useful role in Southeast Asia, but, at the same 
time, another area in which her involvement could easily 
conflict with United States aspirations. Membership on the 
commission, thus, gave Canada her first direct interest in 
Indochina.
6
The American, French and Russian delegated respective­
ly. Ibid. p.46l,
7
Ibid, p.46l.
Ô .P. Singh, op.cit.. p.125-127.
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Canadian membership ensured "not neutrality but a ju&- 
âlèlal approach—  a willingness to look at the situation and 
if necessary, agree with decisions which might be contrary
to the wishes of the South Vietnamese, the French or the
9
Americans," Because the Poles, "whose ideology did not per­
mit impartiality, supported the other side 100 per cent, Ca­
nada was appointed to make sure the (Western) side of the
10
case got a fair hearing." Her role, therefore, was to be 
one of judicial overseer although, after 1963, Canada did ac­
tively pursue her own interests there outside the realm of 
commission work. As will be seen, it became increasingly 
difficult for Canada to maintain complete objectivity in what 
she considered a threat to world security. Just as in Korea, 
when the latent possibility of world war was present though 
not imminent, in Vietnam Canada took what must be considered 
a pro-American leaning on the commission after 1963. This 
view, however, was combined with a stronger extra-commission 
approach that was more of an independent than pro-American 
leaning.
Canada's reaction to events in Vietnam would be compa- 
tible with her general approach to world security. Indeed, 
even if Canada had no direct commitment, it was conceivable 
that she still would have shown concern for developments
9
Holmes, op.cit., p.471.
10
Ibid, p.471.
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there. "We know from experience," said Pearson, "that just
as local conflicts can become general war, so conditions of
security and stability in any part of the world, would serve
11
the cause of peace everywhere," While her role on the com­
mission did offer her a chance to serve herself as well, it is 
conceivable that .she would have found a way to promote peace 
in the area had she not been a member. This would be an 
expression of her general post-war goal of eliminating hosti* 
lity, especially that to which the United States was a party. 
This elimination was sought not only because Canada might 
become involved, but also to permit conditions for economic 
relations with an area hitherto untapped.
This attitude was a part of the rationale for the Colo­
mbo Plan, which included Canada. Generally, Canada's prospe­
rity "depended traditionally on a complex Interchange of
12
goods all around the world." Canada, therefore, had a
vested Interest in the re-establishment of normal trading re-
13
lations in the greatest possible volume. Thus, Canada was
interested in facilitating conditions of "political and eco-
14
nomic security in the Par East,." as a pre-condition to ex-
11
Pacificus, op.cit.. p.270.
12
Spencer, op.cit.. p.189.
13
Ibid. p.189.
14
Ibid. p.52.
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pansion of her own trade. These were some of the Canadian 
attitudes which must be considered in the context of the 
Vietnamese situation from 1954 onward.
A full picture of Canadian-American mutual involvement 
in Vietnam cannot be complete without a review of American 
Involvement there since approximately 1950. While Canada was 
in a position to look at Geneva in 1954 with an air of rela­
tive dispassion, the United States could not—  especially in 
light of events since the fall of Kuomintang China in 1950.
The period of hostilities in Vietnam from 1946 to 1950
was looked upon by the United States mainly as an indigenous
struggle between the French and the guerillas in Northern
Vietnam under Ho Chi Mlnh. This conflict was viewed largely
as a colonial one in which the United States did not want to
become militarily committed. Such direct commitment, it was
felt, would cast the United States in the role of an advoca-
te of imperialism, thus partially forestalling the evolution
of the underdeveloped world. Moreover, the United States did
not want to become involved in the relations "between a mother-
.15
country and a colony. At this time, the United States felt 
nothing of the moral, military, or political commitment which 
permeated American involvement from 1963 to 1967. The turn­
ing point in the earlier attitude came after Mao's control of 
China. This eventsâtaûneechhahgid the American appraisal of
15
D.D. Eisenhower, cited in V. Bator, Vietnam; A Diplo­
matic Tragedy. (New York; 1965) p.6.
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the Indochinese conflict from one of an indigenous struggle 
into the light of another communist confrontation. At this 
point the United States interest in French activity was also 
reappraised.
The forces of the French Union, according to United Sta­
tes policy, were
engaged against the forces of communist aggression
in Indochina (as) an integral part of the world­
wide resistance by the free nations to communist 
attempts at conquests and subversion (even though)
France has the major role there. 16
Thus "if Indochina fell," wrote Eisenhower, "not only Thailan<
but Burma and Malaya would be threatened, with added risks
for East Pakistan, South Asia and (other parts) of Indochina 
17
as well," Still, the United States did not want to shift
18
the war from French shoulders to theirs and it was hoped
that the United States would not have to send ground troops 
19
there. Even by that time, however, there were events fo­
menting in Indochina, and elsewhere, to make American direct 
involvement there a fact.
16
Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1952, p.10101
17
Bator, op.cit.. p.l4.
18
Ibid. p.l4.
19
This was the opinion of then Vice-President Nixon. 
New York Times, April 18, 1954.
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By January 1950 Ho Obi Minh and. Peking exchanged repre­
sentatives, and Moscow, shortly thereafter, followed suit.
Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the Viet-minh troops, also had 
said in 1953 that, instead of harassing guerilla activities
pursued until then, "he was preparing an offensive attack
20
for the conquest of Indochina in its entirety." The fall 
of Dlen Bien Phu and the Geneva Agreements themselves, coup­
led with these events, rounded out the conditions for direct 
United States commitment.
The fall of Bien Bien Phu was a humiliating defeat for 
the French. While she was still militarily stronger than the 
guerillas, Dien Bien Phu had a tremendous psychological effect 
on the French people as well as the French army. The already 
war-weary public grew even more so after 15,000 of their best 
forces were annihilated by the Viet-minh. "There is no ques- 
tion of the extent and nature of the French fighting this
war," said Bedell Smith, "they have been at it now for almost 
21
eight years." After Dien Bien Phu, the French obviously de- 
cided eight years had been long enough.
The French defeat had also come on the eve of the Geneva 
Conference, and had the effect of generally softening their 
position regarding an Indochina settlement. Not only were
20
Bator, op.cit., p.10-11.
21
Department of State Bulletin, (March 7, 1954), p.589.
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they eager for a negotiated settlement, but they desired to 
rid themselves of a war they knew they could not win. It 
was largely this desire that fostered the final agreements, 
over eighty per-cent of which were devoted to military with­
drawal, Because France wanted to get out of Vietnam quickly, 
the result was a rather abortive conference which left the 
cause of the Indochinese war untouched, i.e. political settle­
ment of Northern and Southern Vietnam. These developments 
set the atmosphere for the Geneva Conference, and made it in­
creasingly difficult for a genuinely stable solution. More­
over, when an agreement was drawn-up, the United States would 
not sign.
American domestic opinion in 1954 remained virulently
22
anti-communist, especially anti-Chinese communist. The 
United States still had not recognized Mao’s regime, and 
Dulles was, therefore, reluctant to affix his signature to a 
document which bore Chou En-lai’s also. Moreover, the United 
States, as Canada, was there only as an interested party, and 
did not feel ready at this time to commit itself ^  .jure to 
Indochina, The United States would, however, respect the 
accords, and "view with grave concern" the action of anyone who 
violated them. They had even included this in the appendage 
to the accords— an appendage which was partly responsible for 
American involvement later.
22
See below Chapter 5, and M.A. Guhin, "The United States 
and thetChinese People’s Republic; The Non-Recognition Policy 
Reviewed", International Affairs, Vol.45, No.1, January, 1969, 
p.44-64. This aftïcië contains instructive Congressional and 
public opinion in the United States during the middle fifties.
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By "Viewing with grave concern" any violation of the 
agreements, the United States had become ^  facto the only 
party committed to seeing them work. They had, in fact, under­
written the agreements to the point that additional commit­
ments, if necessary, would be forthcoming. This attitude, : 
however, was couched in global terms as a determination to 
preserve international security. Bedell Smith put the Ameri­
can case succlntly when he quoted the main provision of the 
addendum. Here it was affirmed that the United States would
refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb 
the agreements, but....would view any renewal of the 
aggression in violation of the....agreements as se­
riously threatening international peace and security. 23
This commitment was reinforced In 1955 by Eisenhower's
controversial letter to Diem, new President of South Vietnam.
In it Eisenhower put forth the prospect of "American aid given
directly (to Vietnam) to assist in (her) present hour of 
24
trial." By giving aid directly to South Vietnam, the United 
States had become the main provider for the infant republic, 
and was to that extent committed to make it work. Since 1949, 
the United States had been giving military and economic assis­
tance to South Vietnam, but had always done so through France. 
With this letter, overt ties to France were removed and the
23
M. Raskin and B. Pall, "How the French Got Out of Viet­
nam", in The Vietnam Reader, (New York;1967).p.86.
24
Ibid. p.100.
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United States was alone responsible for South Vietnam and the 
Diem regime.
It is interesting to note that contained in both docu­
ments the express reasons for aid were resistance to aggresa- 
Sion, This, Eisenhower and Smith had both stated. Such re­
ferences point up the fear of communist subversion in Vietnam 
shared by policy-makers in the United States. Whether guerilla 
activity at that time could be construed as such was a tech­
nical point and not considered. However, what was important 
was that, rightly or wrongly, communist subversion was thought 
to be possible in Indochina, and that the United States had 
to act to try to contain it. By these references the United 
States had placed the Indochinese question in the context of 
the Cold War struggle. It, therefore, was to be the justifi­
cation for their presence in South Vietnam. Moreover, such a 
rationale would not make American presence there imperialist­
ic. This justification was to make a reversal of American 
policy more difficult in later years, as was the massive aid 
program to the Diem regime of the late fifties.
The huge assistance program carried on by the United Sta- 
25
tes to Vietnam reinforced her verbal commitment, even though 
it did nothing to solve the intricate social and political 
problems which were at the root of the trouble. For these
25
It was estimated that fully 65 percent of the Vietnam­
ese economy was supported directly by the United States in the 
period from 1954-1955 to approximately 1957. See W. Henderson, 
South Vietnam Finds Itself", Foreign Affairs 1957. Vol.35,
No.2, p.271-283, p.280.
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particular problems, it was felt that Diem himself could con­
solidate diverse elements in Vietnam, and many held him up
26
as a sort of saviour to that country. This aid and the ho­
pe in Diem, combined with the Manila Pact, or SEATO, in 1954, 
to complete the conditions for an Increased American commit­
ment.
The Manila Pact was designed, "to the extent that it 
(was) practicable, throw a mantle of protection over Laos,
27
Cambodia and the free territory of Vietnam," Such a man­
tle, said Dulles,
(would), in fact, make a substantial contribution 
to preserve free governments in Southeast Asia 
and prevent communism from rushing into the Paci­
fic area where it would threaten the defense of 
the United States. 28
SEATO went into effect late in 1954 and was, no doubt, part 
of the reasoning behind United States aid. Thus, by 1955, 
the United States had undertaken the moral and political com­
mitments which would inextricably involve her in the Vietnam 
crisis culminating in the sixties.
Behind these commitments lay one theme, containment. 
However, by associating Vietnam with containment in general, 
the United States was trying to solve essentially political
26
Eisenhower and Cardinal Spellman among them,
27
Barter, 00.cit.. p,l62.
28.
Ibid, p.162,
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problems by military and economic means. Indeed, even mas­
sive aid did not alleviate the root cause of the dilemma.
What that aid did in fact was to make the Diem regime and 
Vietnam, more dependent on American tutelage than ever be,2 
fore. In effect, the United States had built a castle on sand. 
By i9 6 0 the castle was falling.
American activity in Vietnam in the early fifties was 
largely not an issue per se in Canadian-Amerlcan relations. 
Such American involvement, however, was to play a large part 
in these relations later in the decade. It is significant, 
though, that precisely during the years of increasing Ameri­
can involvement, 1950 to 1955, Canada was careful to remain 
somewhat aloof, prior of course to her 1080 appointment. In­
deed, before Geneva, Pearson felt that because "the problem 
of Indochina had never been submitted to the United Nations,
29
Canada had never been as directly concerned with Indochina," 
Moreover, it was logical that, after having been involved in 
Korea, Canada wanted little to do with another theater of war. 
This unequal emphasis is significant because while the lOSO 
was her first close association with the area, the United 
States had been concerned to the point of giving aid for at 
least five years. Thus, at the time of Canada's election to 
the IC8C, the United States felt it had vital interests in 
Vietnam and, because of the troika principle, Canada would
29
D.C, Masters, Canadian World Affairs, 1953 to 1955. 
(Toronto:1959) P.81. --- - -------------------  -----
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be the one to look after them. Moreover, In 1954 Canada did
not share any of the neurotic factors of aversion to commu-
30
nisia that permeated American policy in the Par East. All
these factors were to make Canada's position on the lOSC more
difficult to pursue, and a possible source of friction in
Canadian-American relations.
Because Canada accepted a position on the ICSC she was
"in a sense committed to trying to make the Geneva settle-
31
ment effective." Yet it was an agreement to which the Uni­
ted States had not given their unconditional support. Indeed, 
even the government of South Vietnam had refused to sign the 
accords. Moreover, Canada was "taking on an important duty
in a part of the world with which she had no direct acquain- 
32
tance." Now, however, "there was no United Nations direc-
33
tion of policy or responsibility" as there had been in Kor|j 
There was,-;also, none of the international justification tha 
came with the United Nations. On the contrary, from the be-| 
ginning it was tacitly assumed by all concerned that Canada | 
was there for one purpose, to look after United States in-
30
Holmes, op.cit.. p.458.
31
Ibid. p.461.
32
Ibid. p.471.
33
Ibid. p.471 .
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terests. Although Canada would like to believe
she is there because of her reputation for 
fairness, impartiality and objectivity, (she 
was put there) because she is a close ally 
of the United States and a....member of the 
NATO alliance. 34
Thus, the expectation of satellitism was apparent even in
1954.
Under any conditions, a completely Impartial Canadian 
judgement on the commission would have proven difficult, but 
it became even more difficult in light of the Intense Ameri­
can build-up after 1963. In this regard membership on the 
commission proved less than helpful to Canadian prestige and 
interests, since any stand supporting American policy could 
make Canada appear as a "lackey of the imperialists" or a 
"Western Poland." Similarly, staunch refusal to condone or 
offer a rationale for American policy could have led to a de­
terioration of Canadian-Amerlcan relations at a time, the 
middle and late fifties, when there was much anti-American 
sentiment anyway. Assumption of a place on the commission, 
therefore, offered Canada little but a chance to moderate 
American policy, somewhat along the lines of the Korean Crisis.
lihen the Indochinese war flared up again in the early six- 
35
ties, her role on the commission was not conducive to such
34\
llngh, op.cit.. p. 129.
31
There was never really a complete halt to the Indochi­
nese War, even from 1954 to 1958. Events in North and South 
Vietnam were smoldering such that there was always some ho­
stility, most of which was subversive in nature, though not 
always supported from the North.
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Influence, and It was at that time that Canada expressed her 
views in other ways.
It is important to note that the period 1954 to 1958 
was one of relative calm in Vietnam. This was, no doubt due 
in large measure to the fact that Ho Chi Minh felt confident 
that, should elections take place, he would win them. This 
view was generally shared by all, even Eisenhower. When, in 
1956, it became evident to Ho that elections were not going 
to take place, it was only then that the conflict was re-in- 
itlated, on a gradually ascending level. The point is, how­
ever, that it would be unfair to suggest that Canadian ac­
tivity on the commission, or the commission itself, fostered 
the conditions that led to the intense hostilities of the 
sixties. Indeed, there were few at this time who foresaw 
this. Moreover, the commission had succeeded in overseeing 
a cessation of hostilities between the French and the guer­
illas,,and in troop withdrawal; the main provisions of the 
1954 accords. There were, thus, no loud calls for negotia­
tion that permeated the period 1963 to 1967, and thus no real 
reason for Canada to try to initiate them.
While there were general problems in accomplishing the 
ultimate objective of peace in the area, Canada acknowledged 
them. Indeed, the ICSC had issued reports which pointed to 
that fact. "The degree of cooperation," said the 1957 re­
port,
given by the two parties is not the same. While
/
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the commission has experienced difficulties in 
the North of Vietnam, the major part of its dif­
ficulty has arisen in the South." 36
This memorandum, with Canada in agreement, is indicative of
the responsible position she took during this period. It wgs
this type of posture that enabled Paul Martin to say that
Despite the temptation to live up to the con­
ference's expectations, Canada decided from the 
beginning to avoid the role of rigid advocate for 
the West and instead tried to promote an object- 
tive and balanced approach by the commission. 37
This Canadian response to developments In Vietnam during 
that period were very much similar to her response to the 
Korean question earlier in the decade. Canada, in the late 
fourties, took a judicious approach to UNTOOK, and one that 
she felt was necessary. On the ICSC there was more at stake 
than being a voice for the United States, for it became ap­
parent that Canada's prestige was on the line as well. A 
responsible approach to ICSC work conceivably would garner 
more diplomatic credits in Asian eyes than being a mimic for 
the United States, This reasoning could not have been absent 
from Canadian thinking.
Canada's attitude of reserved agreement regarding cross­
ing the thirty-eighth parallel for the first time in 1950, 
can be likened to her at least tacit support of increased
36
ICSC Report to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Convention.
1957.
37
Singh, op.cit.. p. 129.
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American involvement in Vietnam. At no time did Canada 
roundly come out and express misgivings about American po­
licy in the earlier stages of commitment. Importantly, when 
there was apprehension, as in the 1957 report, this was giv­
en mainly in the context of the ICSC itself, that is, in 
terms other than a bi-lateral exchange between the United 
States and Canada. Moreover, there was no need for inten­
se concern In the early stages of the Vietnamese conflict, 
since there was no real imminent danger of widespread war.
At that time there was, thus, no justification for indiscri- 
mlnantly "ruffling the eagles feathers." It was not until 
the early sixties, when the position of the Diem regime had 
deteriorated such that stepped-up American military commit­
ment was necessary, that the situation grew more dangerous.
At this time. Increased guerilla activity in the South of 
Vietnam was evident, and it is not unreasonable to assume 
that it was sponsored by the North. In these circumstances 
Canada reacted differently, and, still in agreement with the 
goals of American policy, took an overt stand supporting 
them.
In the ICSC minority report of June 1962 Canada disavow­
ed any condemnation of increased American military activity 
in Vietnam- activity which was construed by India and Poland 
as being a clear violation of the Geneva Agreements which pro­
hibited "the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops....
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38
military personnel....arms and munitions," Canada's minor
ity report offered what amounted to a rationale of American
policy in Vietnam,
The majority report, in essence, stated that military
action had been taken against installations In the North of
Vietnam by the South, and indicated the seriousness of the 
39
situation, Canada, while agreeing that "the situation con­
tinued to be unstable," believed that the cause "must be seen 
40
in context," lest one
run the risk of giving the members of the Geneva 
Conference a distorted picture of the problem in 
Vietnam and its underlying causes. 41
What followed was a carefully worded justification for the
attacks on the North by the South, Such raids, said the
minority report,
I
(were) a dramatic manifestation of a continuing 
instability which has (been)....the deliberate 
and persistant pursuit of aggressive but largely 
covert policies by North Vietnam directed against 
South Vietnam. 42 \
38
See David Schoenburn, Vietnam; How We Got In. How To 
Get Out. (New York; 1968) p. 130.
39
ICSC Report, op.cit.. June 1962.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
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The North, moreover,
(has) allowed their zone to be used for inciting, 
encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in 
the zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of 
the administration in the South, 43
The report further stated that, because of Increased arms and
support for anti-Saigon guerillas,
the government of South Vietnam has been obliged 
to request increased foreign aid for self-defense, 44
By placing the onus of guilt on the North, Canada was
sane tiding Southera r e t a l l a ^ ^ .  More over 7'''%'ooor'^ nR to "tE
minority report, the events which had transpired were "the
direct result of the aggressive policy of the government of
North Vietnam" and that such activity 'bonstituted the root
45
cause of general instability in Vietnam." Thus, not only
had Canada laid the blame at Hanoi’s feet, but later stated
that it would be up to her to cease such action "as a prere-
46
quisite of the restoration of peace in Vietnam," The re­
port, by implication, also held out the United States as some­
what of a saviour of South Vietnam.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46mi.
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Canada’s action in view of these hostilities pointed up 
her increasing concern over Vietnam. However, it is well to 
remember that even then there was no imminent danger of wide­
spread war. Canada, therefore could reasonably go along with 
the policy of the United States somewhat in deference to the 
letter's deepening commitments. There was, moreover, good 
reason to believe that the Canadian position was an accurate 
statement of what she felt was really happening in Vietnam.
The action of India and Poland can be construed as Inter­
preting the violation in the letter of the agreements rather 
than in the spirit. In the case of Poland their position is 
understandable. However, Indian action could also be inter­
preted as an expression of her reluctance to sanction American 
activity in Vietnam; activity which India may have construed
47
as American surpression of an Indigenous national movement. 
Thus, it is reasonable to Interpret the Indian and Polish 
majority report in light of other developments, Ifhlle much 
the same can be said for Canada, there is less reason to 
assume a strict subservient role with respect to the United 
States, especially when the Diefenbaker government was still 
in power. It would seem folly Indeed to jeopardize a 
hitherto judicious role on the commission, for what was 
then thought to be ilmple retaliation, and which no one
47
It is also well to remember that the 1962 report appeared 
prior to the Sino-Indian border clash.
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felt would escalate as quickly as it did. Similar to the
Korean Crisis, therefore, Canada was taking a pro-American
stance not only because she believed it justifiable but be-
cange there was really no point in doing otherwise.
However, with the air raids on the North by American
bombers in 1965, Canada’s concern became intense, and her
reaction to Amerloa^oollcv from that time to 1967 was one of
attempted modification,_____
The period from 1964 to 1967 was marked by a period of
intense escalation on the part of both North and South Viet-
48
nam and the United States, The air raids on the North,
moreover, made for an extremely dangerous situation and one
that Canada sought to retard. This period was also marked by
many attempts by Canada to bring the parties to the Vietnam
conflict to the negotiating table.
The American rationale for increased activity in Vietnam
was that "a gradual commitment, with gradual punishment would
4$
(at some point) discourage the communists."
If we had gone slam bang right at the first (in 
1963 he added) we might have won or started World 
War III. 5 0
D
48
See A, Whiting, "How We Almost Went to War With China", 
Look Magazine. April 29, 1969, p.76-79.
49
J.R. Dickenson, "How will History Remember LBJ?", Nat­
ional Observer. January 20, 1969, by an aide of then President 
Johnson.
50
Ibid.
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Thus, the idea of gradual escalation would serve to inform 
the North of the tenacity of American purpose, yet do it in 
such a manner so as not to alarm her powerful neighbor. Com­
munist China. Gonceiveably, Canada could be counted upon to 
go this far also, so long as there was no danger of World 
War III.
With the escalation, however, Canada felt that "the si-
51
tuation (was) more serious than it had been for some time."
So serious in fact that it could (have led) to a great cri- 
52
sis.
We are all deeply concerned with the impli­
cations for world peace (said Paul Martin)....
(increased military activity) contains the 
seeds....of an open conflict of stark and 
terrifying proportions....(and) only if all 
concerned are prepared to exercise restraint..,, 
can the next step toward peaceful settlement 
be taken. 53
In this period the mission of Chester Ronning in 1966 is 
also significant in that it pointed up the Canadian desire to 
reach a negotiated settlement. By that time the bombings had 
been in effect for over a year and the threat to world securi­
ty had been increasing proportionately. His efforts were 
accompanied by other Canadian initiatives led by Lester Pear­
son.
51
External Affairs. Vol.16, No.9, Sept., 1964, p.412.
52
Ibid. p.412.
53
Ibid. Vol.17, Ho.4, April 1965, P.114-116.
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It is significant to note that in this period there was
an almost world-wide consensus to do something to facilitate
a cessation of hostilities. Secretary General of the United
Nations, U Thant, the Belgian Prime Minister, and many others
were all calling for negotiations. While there were critics
of American policy in the United States and in.Canada as well,
all seemed to agree on the need for negotiation. The NDP
Party, even though they did not approve of American policy,
agreed with Paul Martin in "calling for a cease-fire and ne- 
54
gotiations," Diefenbaker, now leader of the Opposition,
55
also felt the same way, and in the United States, Senators 
Morse and Pullbright were constant critics of the war. In 
essence, while Canada's reaction to the infiltration was not 
worth an open break with the United States, their reaction to 
the bombings were of a different nature. While there was no 
pressure to act in the earlier stages, Canada now deemed it 
necessary to try to do something. Pearson's speech in Phila­
delphia in 1965 was indicative of that pressure.
"The progressive application of military sanction," said
Pearson, "can encourage stubborn resistance rather than a
5 6
willingness to negotiate". "Continued intensification of hos-
54
Debates, 1965, p.13095.
55
Ibid, p.13093-1407.
56
Ibid, 1 9 6 5 , p.35-36.
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tllitles", he added, "could lead to uncontrollable escala-
tlon. Earlier Paul Martin had also expressed concern
that the war "could go well beyond the borders of (Vietnam]
itself" and that the United States "should avoid the oonsequ#]
58 1
ces of escalation," Thus, to alleviate this danger, the 1
Canadian government felt that a suspension of the bombings,|
at the right time,
might provide (Hanoi) with an opportunity if 
they wish....to inject flexibility into their 
policy without appearing to do so as the direct 
result of military pressure. 59
Pearson thereupon suggested that
"a measured pause... .might facilitate the de­
velopment of diplomatic resources which cannot 
be easily applied to the problem under existing 
circumstances." 60
With statements as these Canada foresook passive agreement 
with American policy in favor of open diplomatic manoeuvres 
to influence it, although she still clung to the basic tenet 
that communist influence in Southeast Asia was not desireable.
Canada's reactions to the Vietnam War pointed up her de­
sire to modify American policy when she felt that policy was
57
Ibid. 1965, p.35-36.
58
Ibid. 1965, p.1779.
59
Ibid. p.35-36.
60
Ibid. p.35-36.
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"nTi n n ilTi "'1'rrir'T-nTn i ffith immediate threats to ¥_qr'i
^.c^lty. Just as in Korea, Canada attempted to forestall the 
imminent danger of world war. The only difference in the 
United States reaction, however, was that unlike Korea, the 
threat to world peace did not seem to loom as large, and 
therefore Canada's influence and initiatives were not as 
effective as they might otherwise have been.
Thus, analogous to the Korean situation, change of Amer­
ican policy would have to come from within, Canada's contri­
butions not withstanding. This is the typical American re­
action when the United States becomes deeply committed to 
anything, Vietnam included. This is not to say that the 
Canadian peace-feelers were negligible.. Indeed, Ronning's 
mission in 1966 made clear Hanoi's refusal to negotiate un­
less there was "an unconditional and permanent end to the 
6l
bombing," The point is that Canadian initiatives, unless 
they are in concert with American predispositions, will not 
be very effective. While Canadian reactions can be predict­
ed on the basis of the direct ratio between hostilities and 
world security, American policies cannot. Throughout the
rrlTlnj nanaAa'a response combined self in­
terest and judiciousness with a desire not to unduly aggra- 
vate American relations. This main theme and simi-i
lar reactions will be seen again in the question of Communist 
Chinese diplomatic recognition.
61
See Raskin and Fall, op.cit., p.470.
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VCANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION 
OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
The question of recognizing the Communist Regime in 
Peking has been an important one in Canadian-American rela­
tions since the 1949 fall of Ghiang Kai-shek's Nationalist
1
Government. While there have been occasions when Canadian 
policy in this matter has been criticized from within, the 
principal effect of non-recognition in Canada has been the 
ever-present symbol of deference to American policy. Here, 
as in perhaps no other Canadian policy consideration, the 
overbearing influence of the United States has been one, if 
not the only, factor which has retarded Canadian action.
The initiative which in 1969 the Trudeau government has taken 
on the question of recognition was indeed a bold step when 
seen in light of developments since 1949. This action is 
neither illogical or spiteful, but, rather, it is in keeping 
with the basic Canadian reaction to American policy. That 
reaction entails a deference to Washington policy until such 
policy proves to be a possible danger to world security, as 
in Korea and Vietnam, or until Canadian interests are no­
ticeably furthered by divergence from American views.
1
See Debates. on this question from October 1949 to June 
of 1950, especially the NDP party's reaction,
88
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On the question of Chinese recognition, Canada, under 
both the Liberals and Conservatives, felt that neither of 
these two conditions were so prominent as to precipitate an 
open break with Washington. On the contrary, during this 
time Canada has shown a great deal of forebearance to the 
American cause. Whether this attitude was out of understand­
ing, fear, national interest, or a combination of these, it 
was a wise course to take in that the "China question" proved 
to be a highly controversial and embarrassing one for the 
United States.
0 “^  The origins of the United States-China policy go back to
the eighteenth century. "The American concern about the
'Open Door' in 1899 was the latest expression of a long-con*
tanue# interest (in China) which had been manifested in com-
2
mercial, missionary and diplomatic channels," While it is 
not within the scope of this paper to give an historical ac­
count of United States activity there, it is worthwhile to 
note a few of the overriding American policy interests with 
respect to China. As will be seen, these attitudes were not 
shared by Canada, thus making her look at the collapse of 
Chiang Kai-shek In a very different light than did the United 
States,
Basically, there were, and still are, two Interconnected 
foundations for American concern about China, and the Par East
2
Pairbank, op.cit.. p.251.
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/ generally. One was the desire for "an amenable China re­
ceptive to American officials, missionaries, students and 
3
businessman." Below the superficial, yet by no means in­
significant, desire for trade with the Orient lay the spirit 
of Manifest Destiny in United States-China relations. This 
spirit was exhibited not only in the intense missionary work 
of the time, but also in the emotional attachment for the 
Chinese as a people, which was shared by many who had first 
hand contact with them. The other concern, more recent, has
been a search for a "balance of power capable of guaranteeing
4
American security in the Pacific." These two objectives 
were complementary in that a compliant China in the fields of 
trade and commercial enterprise, would be one in the field of 
diplomacy as well. All this would, it was believed, lead to 
the optimal American objective in the Par East-"an indepen­
dent China, strong enough to preserve its security, but one
5
prevented from gaining control over its major neighbors."
This goal, however, grew more illusory with the Chinese Civil 
War which was being pursued intermittently from 1927 to 1949.
3
N.A. Graebner, "China and Asian Security; An American 
Dilemma," International Journal. Vol.XVI, No.3, (Summer : 
1961) p.213-230, p.213. See also H.R. Isaacs, op.cit.. Ch.5.
4
Ibid, p.213.
5
P. Greene, United States Policy and The Security of 
Asia. (New York;1968) p.37.
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In the early stages of that conflict the American fear 
was not so much of Ohlang’s collapse, as it was of the col­
lapse of a China integral to United States Par Eastern pol­
icy. In the middle forties, when the defeat of Japan was 
imminent, China seemed the only logical country to fill the 
power vacuum thus created. In the eyes of American policy­
makers it was reasonable to contend, therefore, that China’s
capabilities, although not at the moment obviously effective,
6
were latently enormous. China, thus, should be groomed to 
inherit the Asian leadership which would be rendered vacant 
by Japan’s demise. This was the rationale for the American 
sponsored drive which ultimately sought great power status 
for China. Thus, when China assumed her seat on the Security 
Council of the UN as one of the Big Five in 1945, she did so 
less by her own merit than by United States influence.
China's status under Chiang, however, was ^Mücy to 
the least. Like the Saigon regime, it too collapsed, and with 
it American hopes for an amenable China and one conducive to 
United States policy. The shock in which the American people 
greeted that collapse was significant and will be dealt with 
later. Suffice it to say now, however, that prior to the 
massive American aid to Chiang and his regime, the United 
States had evolved to policy based more on self-interest.
6
S. K. Hornbeck, "Which Chinese?", Foreign Affairs. 
Vol.34, No.3, October 1955, p.24-39, p.2%1
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Canada, as mentioned above, shared little of the kind of
7
interest in China that the United States had. Although there 
had been great potential in Sino-Canadian trade, such poten­
tial was never, until recently, realized. The fact is that 
while the United States was making a half-turn to the East 
from 1 8 9 8 to 1 9 4 5 , Canada was consolidating her position with­
in the Empire and, later, the Commonwealth. After World War 
II her main concern had been in finding a place for herself 
in a restructured International state system. Thus, "Canada 
had been neither personally nor emotionally engaged in the 
(American) post-war effort to bolster the Kuomintang, and
there was none of the feeling of having ’lost China’ which
8
deeply affected American thinking." When Chiang was subsequ­
ently driven from the mainland in 194-9, some felt that Cana-
9
dian recognition would come as a matter of course. However,
7
Che exception of course was the work of Norman Bethune, 
Canadian doctor and surgeon who worked in China during the 
Civil War. Mao Tse-Tung called him "a great internationalist", 
and one from whom "all (can) learn the spirit of absolute un­
selfishness." See Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse- 
Tun&,(Peklng;l952) Vol.II.
Even with Bethune’s example, however, missionary zeal in 
Canada held none of the popular appeal it had in the United 
States. Missionary activity in general, then, was not frought 
with as many political overtones and therefore not as signifi­
cant in Canada as the United States,
8
J, Holmes, "Canada and China; The Dilemmas of a Middle 
Power," in A,M, Ealpern ed,. Policies Towards China; Views from 
Six Continents, (New York;1965) p,103-122, p,104,
9
0 , Ronning, "Nanking: 1950", International Journal, Vol.X : : 
XXII, No,3, (Summer; 1 9 6 7 ) p,44l-45t, esp, p.442-443,
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recognition did not come then, largely because of the out­
break of the Korean War soon afterj, and has not come at this 
writing, mainly due to the truculent attitude of the United ■/
States, An examination of relations between the United Stat­
es and the Nationalist Government from 1945 to the Korean War 
offers some insight into the American aversion to the Peking 
Regime. In view of the Canadian desire not to indiscriminate­
ly run counter to American policy, this examination also part­
ly explains Canada's reasons for non-recognition at that time. 
Former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hillsman, speak­
ing in 1964 of Chiang's collapse said that the American reac-
10
tion was "anger and disbelief, a sense of betrayal," The
McCarthy era was an indication of how deep and widespread that 
feeling was. Indeed, at first glance it would seem well found­
ed in that in the period 1937 to 1949, the United States had
poured over two billion dollars worth of aid, military and
11
economic, into the shaky Nationalist Regime.
Such aid was necessary, in Truman's words, for the deve­
lopment of "a strong and progressive China making a full con-
12
tribution to the strength of the family of nations," The
10
Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1954, p.11- 
17, P,16,
11
See The China White Paper. August 1949, p,1042-1046, 
esp, p,1043“io44.
12
ibid. p.981,
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China that Truman had In mind, however, long since had proved
inept, as the long internal struggle had seriously weakened
the Nationalist Government, not only militarily and econo* ■
13
mieally, but also politically and in morale. The same gov­
ernment that had received massive injections of United States 
help had, through graft and nepotism, "lost the crusading
spirit that won the people’s loyalty during the early stages 
14
of the war," Is a result,
they had sunk into corruption and a scramble 
for place and power,,,,into a reliance upon 
the United States to win the war for them and 
preserve their own domestic supremacy, 15
Chiang's ineptness apparently had been suspected by Tru­
man as early as 1946 when, in a letter to Ohiang, he felt that 
the United States could not "be expected to continue in its
generous attitude toward (him) unless (there were proof) that
16
genuine progress was being made" toward a peaceful settles 
mefitof China's internal problems. To this end, Truman sent 
General George Marshall to China for the purpose of a nego­
tiated settlement of the Civil War.
It would seem, then, that Truman was, at this time, more
13
Ibid. p.VIII,
14
Ibid. p.VIII; See also H.E, Isaacs, op.cit,. Oh, 8-9,
15
White Paper, op.cit,. p.VIII.
16
Ibid. p.652,
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Interested in a stable China than he was with a stable Nati­
onalist Government,- It was also obvious in Marshall's mis­
sion that the search for a peaceful China seemed to override 
concern for Ohiang Kai-shek, at least in 1946, "It was im­
perative" said Marshall, "that efforts be made to bring (Mao)
into the government and that the greatest care should be taken
17
to avoid having military action disrupt the negotiations,"
"The Communists", he added, "were too large a military and
18
civil force to be ignored,"
It is plausible to assume, then, that during the period 
1945-1947 the official response to the Chinese civil war had 
none of the emotional fervor that was to dominate it in later 
years. The reaction then was more pragmatic and less tainted 
with fear of Communism, Indeed, Truman himself, in 1945, said 
that,
peace, unity, and democratic reform in China 
will be furthered if the basis of (China's) 
government is broadened to include other po­
litical elements in the country, 19
Dean Acheson also, in 1948, seemed to be playing down the Un­
ited States involvement.
The United States (he said) must not become 
directly involved in the Chinese Civil War
17
Ibid, p.127-145,
18
Ibid, p,127-145,
19
Ibid. p.272.
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(or) assume responsibility for underwriting 
the Chinese government militarily and econo­
mically. 20
"Present developments," he went on to say,
make it unlikely that any amounts of United 
States military or economic aid would make 
the present Chinese government capable of 
re-establishing and then maintaining its 
control throughout all of China. 21
Thus, the American official attitude prior to the collapse of 
Ohiang seemed to be evolving to one of resignation. Indeed, 
the publication of the Department of State "China Ifhite Paper", 
showing the corruptness of the Kuomintang and massive American 
aid, was an attempt to relieve the United States of responsi­
bility for his debacle.
It was also apparent that, seeing the imminence of his 
fall, the United States had to look out for its own interests.
Indeed, as Acheson had said, American policy "should preserve
22
maximum freedom of action," in case of just such a conting­
ency, It is logical to assume, therefore, that American pol­
icy-makers, if not the American people, were at least aware of 
Chiang's tenuous position and were preparing for his demise.
It is also logical to assume that, in view of Mao's triumphs, 
the United States was gradually trying to remove the stigma of
20
Ibid. p.280,
21
Ibid, p.281,
22
Ibid. p,286.
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supporting the Nationalists and quietly disengage themselves 
from Chinese internal politics. It was apparent that, in 
this period, the United States was,, in some vague way, stri­
ving toward a modus vivendi with Mao and the Communist Re­
gime. In light of this, the furore that surrounded the "loss" 
of China seemed unwarranted. While this is to a certain ex­
tent true, it does not take into account pertinent Internal 
developments of American politics.
While Chiang's fall from power had been prepared for in 
the State Department, there was no such preparation for the 
general public. It was the latter that was dismayed at the 
so-called "loss" of China and men like Senators Knowland, 
McCarthy, Bridges and Jenner parlayed this loss into politi- 
dal.fortinsi. Thus, charges that the State Department had 
been infested by Communists, although groundless, were never­
theless exploited by politicians in 194-9 and 1950,
Whether or not these charges, and the resultant public 
opinion stemming from them, would have prevented the United 
States from ultimately recognizing the new regime is largely 
speculative, but it is conceivable that they would not. In­
deed, even the New York Times in January of 1950 had said
'l
that "recognition was inevitable" and "just a matter of time", 
A Gallup Boll as late as June 1950 indicated that fully 6o
23
MoA, Guhin, op.cit., p,47.
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percent of the public had no opinion or were in favor in re- 
24
cognition. The whole upshot of the situation in the mid­
dle of 1950, then, was a gradual evolution of United States 
policy towards recognition. Even Acheson, writing in 1950, 
seemed to be preparing the nation for it.
It is abundantly clear (he said) that we must 
face the situation as it exists in fact. We 
will not help the Chinese or ourselves by bas­
ing our policy on wishful thinking, 25
Indeed, the great moralist, John Poster Dulles, in a rare mo­
ment of candor, had written in 1949 that, if the Communist 
government of China proves its ability to govern China with­
out serious domestic resistance then it (should not only be
2 6
recognized but also) admitted to the UN." Clearly then, as 
late as June 7, 1950, the decision not to recognize the Peking 
Regime would stem from quarters other than the United States 
government. The actions of the Peking Regime itself at this 
early stage proved to be the stumbling block.
It is significant to note that even during the early sta­
ges of the Nationalists fall, and after 1950, both the Cana­
dian and American delegations did not leave the mainland or
24
Ibid. p.4 7 .
25
R, Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs, 
ed, by A, Doak Barnett, (lew York;Ï966) p,i07.
2 6
Q, Wright, "Non-Recognition of China and International 
Tensions", Current History. Vol.34, No,199,(March;1958) p,152- 
157.
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the capital of Nanking, This is indicative of the prevalent 
attitude among those observers then in China, as they too were 
apparently preparing for recognition. Indeed, American Am­
bassador Leighton Stewart had for a long time
seen the handwriting on the wall forecasting the 
inevitable downfall of (the Nationalist) regime,..,27
Thus, the official American source of information was obvious­
ly cognizant of Chiang’s collapse, and was preparing to stay 
in the Chinese capital to try to accomodate Mao Tse-tung,
The assumption that the United States was, in late 1949, 
preparing for recognition is strengthened by the American de­
cision to authorize Stewart to stay in Nanking when Ohiang
28
fled to Canton, Indeed, Stewart had even rejected the
Nationalist invitation to leave Nanking for the new national- 
29
1st capital.
The Canadian delegation also seemed to be preparing for
recognition. Indeed, by 1950
there was no doubt (on the part of Canada's le­
gation) that the criterion for recognition of the 
new government had been adequately met, 30
These criteria, as put forth by Lester Pearson, consisted of
27
Ronning, op.cit,, p,42,
28
Ibid. p.442.
29
Ibid. p.442,
30
Ibid, p,442.
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"independence of external control , an ability to control
the territory it claims," and that it be reasonably well-de- 
31
fined, "When these requirements are met," continued Pear­
son, "consideration should be given to the recognition of a
32
government in China or in any other part of the world,"
Chester Ronning, head of the Canadian Delegation in Nanking,
thus "assumed that the embassies and legations in Nanking
33
would be moved to (Peking)," and therefore that recognition 
would be shortly forthcoming.
If both the American and Canadian governments were pre­
paring for recognition, however, the initial actions of the 
new regime at least retarded those developments. Because of 
the Chinese harassment of Mr, Stewart, his eventual arrest, 
and other belligerent acts against American personnel, im­
mediate United States recognition was not forthcoming. This 
is not to say it was the only reason for non-recognition, but 
that this type of Chinese activity made the United States 
government increasingly less amenable to recognizing the new 
regime. So too, Mao himself did not seem to be entirely well- 
disposed to American support of iliang. He had felt that such
31
Debates, 1949, p.1108,
32
Ibid, p,1108,
33
Ronning, op.cit,, p.442,
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support was an attempt to "reduce China virtually to a Uni-
34
ted States colony." Liu Shao-chi also said, in 1948, that
it would he extremely harmful and erroneous 
to harbor illusions that American imperialism 
would in good faith help the Chinese people to 
achieve real independence, peace and democracy. 35
Canada, however, was not in the same position and their 
delegation did not suffer similar harassment. Thus, it was 
likely that while both Canada and the United States were pre- 
paring to accomodate the Peking Regime, theCanadian Govern- 
ment probably would have done so first. Indeed, Great Bri­
tain and India had already done so, and it would seem, owing 
to the memory of Bethune and the amiable relationship between 
Chou En-lai and Chester Ronning, that Mao would have been in
favor of its acknowledgement. To this end, thus, Ronning and
36
Chou were making arrangements for reciprocal recognition.
Reciprocity was extremely important in the Canadian view.
Indeed, according to Ronning,
Ottawa wanted to avoid the embarrassment of ex­
tending unreciprocated recognition as that ex- 
perlenced by the United Kingdom. 37
Even though Canadian public opinion in 1950 was not thought to
34
R, Blum, op.cit,, p,94,
35
Ibid. p,94.
36
Ronning, op.cit,. p.444,
37
Ibid. p,444i
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be fully in favor of recognition, it was felt, by Pearson
and St. Laurent, that in due course recognition would be 
38
accorded. The whole situation was altered, however, by the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950.
For both Canada and the United States the Korean War sig­
nalled a re-appraisal of the recognition question. When Com­
munist Chinese "volunteers" entered the war, recognition, it 
seemed, was shelved indefinitely. While Canada and the United 
States looked at the war differently, they both arrived at the 
same conclusion —  recognition of the Peking Regime could not 
come at that time.
In the view of American policy-makers, the invasion of 
South Korea was effected with at least the approval and quite 
possibly the aid of the Soviet Union. China, moreover, was
probably not unaware of such aid and perhaps even encouraged 
39
it. When the thinly veiled "volunteers" entered the war this 
possibility became a reality, It was apparent at that time 
that the traditional American desire for a well-disposed 
China and one which could act as a favorable weight in the 
balance of power in the Far East was no longer possible. This, 
coupled with the hostile public reaction and the height of the 
McCarthy furore,made it impossible for the United States to
38
Paul Martin, address to University of Windsor, March 15,
1969.
39
Truman, op.cit,, p,342 et, seq.
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recognize the People's Republic of China. Truman's order to 
the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Formosa Straits, moreover, 
while originally intended to limit the war to the Korean pen­
insula, had the effect of protecting Chiang from a possible 
invasion from the mainland. From that point, then, tacit 
American support for the Formosa government was implied, and 
this was to become the symbol of American refusal to recog­
nize the Mao Regime, Canada's refusal, although due in no 
small measure to American attitudes of 1950, ostensibly came 
as a result of her membership in the UN,
40
Because Canada was committed to the still Infant US’,
she felt it essential to preserve the principle of collective
security. Since it was becoming increasingly apparent that
the failure of this principle would place the UN in a grave
alongside the old League of Nations, Canada felt it impera--
tive to uphold collective security. Moreover, because the UN
had named China the aggressor in the Korean War, Canada felt
it would be impossible to then recognize her. Thus, according
to Lester Pearson,
Until the war ends and China abandons her 
attack against the United Nations in Korea, 
there can be no question of,,,«recognition 
of that regime in Peking. There can be no 
question even of considering it while the 
Chinese defy the United Nations in Korea 
and fight against our (sic) forces there, 4l
40
See above Chapter III,
41
Debates 1951, p,2750.
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Previously, because of Internal opposition and a gener­
al desire to proceed cautiously, Canada had withheld the for­
mal act of recognition. Conceivably, she was also content 
with the progress of the Ronning-Chou negotiations. How­
ever, when the Korean War broke out, Pearson thought that 
Canada "did not feel justified in taking any action toward
recognition until the circumstances surrounding aggression in
42
Korea became clearer." Similarly, "when Peking joined in
the aggression in Korea it was inconceivable that (Canada)
43
would change (her) policies. The United States took a sim­
ilar view of recognition, since the American public became "ada- 
mently opposed to recognizing a government whose policies
during the Korean War brought humiliation to their land and
44
death to their young men," Thus, the outbreak of the Korean 
War served to justifiably postpone recognition for both Ca­
nada and the United States, at least until after the hostil­
ities had ended.
By the time the Korean War was over, however, the United
45
States looked at China and saw nothing but Communism, With
42 
Ibid. 1950, P.B55.. 
43 
Ibid. 1950, p.555 
44
J, Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs 1955-1957. (Toronto; 
1967) P.76,
45
Fairbahk, op.cit., p.4,
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the Dulles and Eisenhower era, "new moral criteria became
46
the deciding factors" to recognition, thus making it more
difficult to accord. For Canada, that era also proved to be
a tripwire for recognition, since it became apparent that
"an ill-timed act of recognition by Canada might appear (to
47
the United States) as a betrayal and a slap in the face.
■In John Holmes* words,
the United States became so deeply committed 
against Peking that recognition by any of its 
allies was bound to appear more unfriendly than 
such a move had seemed when the British, Dutch 
and others had acted before June 1950. 48
Thus, the Canadian government acted accordingly and withheld 
recognition. This was done, however, not so much out of a 
fear of Washington reprisal, but rather in the hope of retain­
ing the status of America’s good friend and ally.
Indeed, prior to this time Pearson was quick to point 
out that
recognition does not imply or signify moral 
approval,but it is simply acknowledgement of 
a state of affairs that exists. 49
Similarly, the Canadian government
46
Ronning, op.cit., p.442-443.
47
Eayrs, op.cit.. p.26.
48
Holmes, op.cit.. p.104,
49
Debates, 1949, p.1838.
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rejected completely the Marxlst-Lennlst prin­
ciples espoused by the Chinese Communists. 50
It is obvious, therefore, that during the Korean War, and un-
til 1954, the Canadian government exhibited justifiable de­
ference to American policy. From 1954 onward, however, Cana­
dian action regarding recognition can be viewed as a "persis-
51
tant yet frustrated attempt" to recognize the Peking Regime. 
The United States, however, during these years found it in- 
creasingly difficult to recognize the Chinese Peoples Repub­
lic.
If the United States was anywhere near recognition in 1950, 
the Korean War quickly erased any possibility. From 1954, then, 
American policy became more adamantly opposed to Mao's Regime 
and at the same time more disposed to the Formosa Regime of 
Chiang Kai-shek. From withholding recognition on the moral 
grounds that Communism was evil, after 1954 the United States 
began withholding it on strategic considerations and holding 
it up as humanitarian alternatives to Communism. These attl- 
tudes also involved the United States more deeply in its commit­
ment to Taiwan.
At the end of the Korean War the Nationalist Government 
acquired a special place in the American security policies of 
the Western Pacific. Dean Acheson had outlined the Pacific
50
Ibid. 1 9 4 9 , p.1 8 3 8 .
51
Holmes, op.cit.. p.104.
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defense perimeter prior to the conflict, but had omitted
52
Korea and Formosa. However with the presence of the Ame­
rican Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits during the Korean 
War, and later on with SEATO, Formosa had come under the 
mantle ofRAmerican security. In 1954 the Seventh Fleet was 
still in the area although for reasons other than limiting the 
aggression to the Korean peninsula. Then, what seemed the 
overt protection of Formosa served a different purpose. This 
purpose evolved during the middle fifties as a "concrete and
necessary symbol of the American determination to contain the
53
Chinese Communists.
In addition to such containment American policy makers
expressed the hope that the communists would encounter insur-
54
mountable obstacles in their attempt to consolidate control.
This was possible it was felt in "light of the many decades
55
of chaos in China as a whole." Thus, if the People's Re*-- 
publie proved incapable of successfully consolidating their 
hold on mainland China, the Nationalist Government, in exile 
on Formosa, would be offered as an alternative. By support­
ing the Nationalist Government, the United States hoped to 
undermine the faith in the Peking Regime. To further this
52
See above Chapter III.
53
Blum, op.cit., p.240.
54
Guhin, op.cit.. p.54.
55
Ibid. p.54.
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erosion, moreover, the United States withheld diplomatic re­
cognition.
In the middle fifties, therefore, the Mao regime was
56
spoken of as "a passing and not a perpetual phase". In4-
deéâ,hy 1958, fully nine years after Mao had conquered the
mainland, Dulles was still harping on the same theme, "While
it is true," he said
(that) there is no reason to believe that the 
Chinese Communist regime Is on the verge of
collapse....there is equally no reason to accept 
its present rule in mainland China as permanent. 57
He went on to say that one day the regime will pass. "By
withholding diplomatic recognition from Peiping, therefore,
.58
the United States sought to hasten that passing.
The island of Formosa was consequently held up as the 
only legitimate successor once that passing was effected.
The successful preservation of Taiwan, therefore, as a rival 
and alternative to Peking became a basic element in American 
policy. It was for these reasons that the American commit­
ment to Taiwan, as well as American aid to the island increas­
ed in the fifties. This aid and hope was underwritten by an 
assumption of the military defense of Taiwan which had been 
a result of the off-shore island crisis of 1954-1955. During
56
Graebner, op.cit.. p.221
57
Blum, op.cit., p.121.
58
Ibid, p.121.
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that crisis, the United States and Ohiang had agreed to the
Mutual Defense Treaty which "assured the Chinese Nationalists
that the United States stood squarely behind them as far as
59
defense of Formosa was concerned," Thus, during this time 
the:lmerican government was moving farther and farther away 
from recognition because of Increased military and strategic 
obligations. At the same time, however, Canada seemed to be 
preparing more than ever for the recognition that was close 
in 1950.
Understandably, American activity and UN commitments from 
the years 194-9 to 1953 retarded the not always latent desire 
on Canada's part to recognize Communist China. During this 
time, however, she could offer a justification for non-recog­
nition on grounds other than a deference to Washington. In­
deed, it was quite plausible for Canada not to recognize a 
power which had been labelled an aggressor by an organization 
which was becoming more and more important to her foreign po­
licy. Similarly, years of war-time cooperation with the Unit­
ed States and the necessity for the letter's partnership in 
NATO must have been uppermost in the minds of Canadian policy­
makers . After the Korean War was over, however, Canada took 
a different position on recognition and began to look at the 
situation more pragmatically.
Speaking in the Commons in 1954, Pearson stated that
59
R.P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs,1954. 
(New York:1955) P.280-2ÏÏU
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Canada had to be "realistic" on the problems of recognition
and "be prepared to deal with those who represent the nation
60
over which they exercise authority," He was offering not 
only a different emphasis to the problem of recognition, but 
was preparing the nation for the realities of the Geneva Con­
ference. Indeed, "the necessity of dealing with Red China
5i
at Geneva," said Pearson "is inescapable." He was also hope­
ful that perhaps the Chinese attitude itself would change, 
and make it easier for Canada to gain more leeway on the re­
cognition question. This could only be done, however, if 
Peking made efforts to remove the stigma of aggressor with 
which the United Nations had labelled her.
"If China adopts a conciliatory attitude at the Geneva
Conference, "Pearson said, "Canada might take a new look at 
62
this problem." This hope for a more conciliatory posture
on Peking's part would be for Canada at least the crack in
the door which might signal formal recognition. Still, the
United States attitude was weighty, since any decision of such
import "required a careful balancing of national and inter-
63
national factors." Indeed, Pearson even quoted Dulles on
60
Debates 1954, p.2748.
61
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the realities of the Chinese question who said that "diplo­
matic intercourse (is useful) between those who exercise ^
64
facto governmental authority,"
Thus, the Canadian government during the middle fifties 
seemed to be coming much closer to the real issues that re­
cognition implied. It is significant that Canada began in­
creasingly to speak of the tangible advantages and disadvanta­
ges: of the question than echo the moral criticisms of Ameri­
can policy makers. Canada was, in Pearson's words, "taking 
another look at the problem - a more realistic, less emotion- 
al look. Indeed, Canada had even divorced herself from
the dangerous possibilities of conflict pregnant in the 
Offshore Island Crisis of 1954-1955. Speaking of that crisis 
Pearson commented that while Canada
could not stand aloof from a major war which 
threatened the very existence of the United 
States (she)....did not consider that crisis 
to be such a situation; or one requiring any 
Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese 
Nationalist regime. 66
It was apparent that Canada, while she never forgot the close
ties that bound her with the United States, was not about to
become engaged in another war so soon after Korea. In this
vein of self interest, any Canadian decision to recognize the
64
Ibid. p.3544.
65
Ibid. 1956, p.711-712.
66
Ronning, op.cit., p.49.
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Mao Regime would be based on "the national and international 
67
advantage" for Canada.
It is significant to note that during this period, while 
Canada was taking important steps to make recognition of China 
a fact, there were two overriding concerns. One was the fact 
that by 1957, after Mao had withstood eight years of American 
non-recognition and the first offshore island crisis, a Can­
adian refusal to recognize Peking could easily be construed 
as undue deference to Washington. While this in itself was 
not advantageous, the fact that the United States might, by 
some stroke of fate, recognize Red China before Canada did 
was even less so. This is made even more significant since, 
during the middle fifties, internal criticism regarding heavy 
American investment was prevalent. Cries of Canada's being 
the ploy of American investors were extremely difficult to 
take and, moreover, such eùtbursts were usually given credence 
by the example of Canadian unwillingness to recognize Peking. 
Because United States intransigence on the recognition issue 
had acquired a symbolic significance, the issue in Canada had,
come, by 1957, to reflect the domination of Canadian external
68
policy by American interests. On the issue of Chinese recog-
67
Debates 1953, p.2748.
68
Eayrs, op.cit.. p.79. See also J, Holmes, op.cit., 
p.104-116. The influence of Diefenbaker was, in no small way, 
also responsible for this attitude.
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nition, therefore. It would be useful for the Canadian govern­
ment to take the initiative on the question "but fatal to be
69
beaten by the Americans themselves," This element was 
another of the very real and pressing problems faced by Cana­
da on the recognition question during the middle fifties. 
Another important concern facing Canada was the Chinese be­
havior itself.
The Korean Conflict, Chinese action in Tibet in 1951» 
and her expressed desire to consolidate her hold on Taiwan 
had always retarded Canadian recognition. It was events such 
as these which prompted Pearson to cautiously appraise the 
recognition question, yet always doing so in a manner to re­
frain from taking an unalterable position on the matter. When, 
therefore, prior to the first Offshore Island Crisis, the 
Peking Regime had proven reasonable in the Geneva negotia­
tions, Pearson expressed the belief that recognition, then, 
was not out of the question. Indeed, after Geneva he had said
that while Canada should not read too much into the improve-
70
ment, "(she) would also be unwise to ignore it." In a 
sober look at Peking's hostility Pearson did not want to appear 
too much like his American opposite number, John Poster Dulles. 
According to Pearson, Canada should not get into the position 
where she would be "demanding positive proof of utter purity
69
Eayrs, op.cit.. p.79. See also Holmes, op.cit
70
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71
from (the Peking) Regime," before consideration of formal 
diplomatic recognition. The first offshore island shelling, 
however, could not be overlooked and, because Oanadian-Amer- 
ican intrahemispheric relations from 1954 to 1957 had deter­
iorated so badly, recognition again was out of the question.
The whole upshot of the situation in the middle and late 
fifties was the result of Canadian ambivalence made more dif- 
flcult by increased American rigidity. Even though Peking 
was more conciliatory in the years 1954 to 1957 Canada could 
not recognize Communist China as long as the American oppos­
ition was so intense. Indeed, Pearson, speaking in 1956 had 
put the Canadian case succinctly. Recognition, he said "was
72
not worth having a first class row with the United States."
As non-recognition continued into the sixties other con­
nected issues came to the fore; the admission of Red China 
into the UN and the question of Taiwan's status.
Because Chiang and his Nationalist Government continued 
to hold the Chinese seat at the UN, the issue of Taiwanese 
as opposed to Nationalist representation became clouded by 
the larger question of Communist Chinese admission. Strictly 
speaking the Taiwanese per se were not represented at the 
United Nations. For both Canada and the United States, the
71
Ibid. p.80.
72
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political question of recognition and admission had to take 
into account the interests of the Taiwanese people.
For United States policy in the early and middle sixties, 
the question of Communist Chinese recognition and admission 
to the UN became more a matter of prestige than strategy. 
Indeed, speaking in 1964 Roger Hillsman had said that the 
United States "had no reason to believe that there is a pre­
sent likelihood that the Communist Regime (would) be over- 
73
thrown." This was merely the formal expression of what had 
been fact since the Korean War. United States non-recogni­
tion policy by the sixties was based on the fear of Communist 
subversion of her non-Communist neighbors. Where earlier, 
recognition had been withheld in an effort to weaken the re­
gime itself, by i9 6 0 there was really no basis for this hope. 
Since the danger in the sixties lay in subversion, the United 
States felt it still had to contain Red China as well as iso­
late her. Then, however, isolation would be strategic and 
defensive Instead of an attempt to undermine her internal po­
sition. Moreover, such isolation would remove the threat of 
militancy espoused by the Chinese Communists.
The adherence to violence ran through most of Peking's 
policies in the late fifties and early sixties and was of­
fered as one reason for not allowing her admission into the 
UN. Because this theme had been incorporated Into the Ame­
rican rationale for non-recognition and admission since the
73
Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1964, p.11-17,
p.13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
Korean War, there arose the fear that any variance In the 
American position would be construed as tacit agreement of 
Peking's policies, and therefore could not be tolerated.
Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, speaking in 1964, sum­
marized the American case when he said such a conciliatory 
attitude "would be very unwise and (would) Indicate to Peking
74
that a policy of militancy is profitable and pays dividends. 
Thus, a favorable attitude to Red Chinese admission could not 
be considered, as the letter's espousal of violence would 
conflict with Article 37 of the UN Charter. Moreover, admi­
ssion of Peking and recognition would, in effect, break the 
American commitments made not only to the people of Taiwan, 
but also to the other non-communist nations of Asia which had 
relied upon American support. A reversal, therefore, on the 
United States non-recognition policy would render her suspect 
in the eyes of many non-communist Asians. United States pres­
tige, then, would inevitably be impaired from such a turna­
bout .
Prestige was also the issue in the UN itself since, by 
i9 6 0 , the United States had become the champion of those who 
were wary of Peking's admission. By I960, however, and even 
as early as 1958, international conditions had so changed 
that the once assured American domination in the UN had become 
weaker.
74
Bulletin, 1964, p.8l8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
It once had In the UN. 
s the Issue of prestige
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Because of the influx of the many Ifro-Asian nations 
in the late fifties, the once-sure voting block commanded by 
the United States lay open to erosion on certain issues.
Since for many of these new states independence from the West 
was the, keystone of their founding, they radically altered 
the global structure from one of bi-polarity to poly-centric. 
In effect,these nations had a mind of their own in foreign 
policy, with the result that the United States could no lon­
ger count on majority support that 
For the United States in these years 
was indeed an important one,
Dulles, however, writing in 1949, had put the recogni- 
tion question succinctly. "If the United Nations membership 
were made substantially universal," he wrote,
that might end a preponderant voting superiority 
of the United States and its friends which, while 
pleasant is somewhat fictions....
....if we want to have a truly world organization 
then it should be representative of the world as 
it is....75
True as Dulles' words were, and are, the United States govern­
ment still could not reconcile Chinese admission with support 
for the Taiwanese government, since control of Taiwan was, for 
Peking, a sine qua non for diplomacy with the West. A tole­
rable attitude toward admission, therefore, would turn over 
de facto the island of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists - the 
same island which had become the pillar of the American non-
75
Guhin, op.cit.. p.44-48.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
recognition policy.
Concern for Taiwan was also becoming apparent in Canada's 
view of recognition and admission. For Canada, the status 
of Taiwan had never been settled satisfactorily. While she 
was somewhat cool to the Nationalist regime itself, she show­
ed concern for the people of Taiwan. Even though Canada was 
aware of the need to deal with Communist China, the answer to 
the recognition question did not lie in accomodating Peking's 
desire to control Taiwan. It was for this reason, then, that 
in 1961 Canada introduced the "Two-China" or "one-China", 
"one-Taiwan" policy.
The "Two-China" plan, as put forth by Senator Alfred 
Brooks of the Canadian UN delegation, held out the possibility 
that both China and Formosa could be admitted to the UN in a 
manner which would not leave the Taiwanese people at the mercy 
of Peking. The future of (Taiwan) said Brooks,
is the affair of the people of (Taiwan). Canadians 
would never understand or accept a solution by which 
(the UN) sanctioned the forcible extinction of the 
political identity of (Taiwan). 76
This formula, however, was not in the least acceptable to
Peking.
Chou En-lai, as quoted by Pearson in the Commons, stated 
that the Chinese People's Republic would "not tolerate any
76
P. Lyon, Canada in/World Affairs 1961-1963. (Toronto:
1968) p.303.
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77
plot to carve up Chinese territory and create two Chinas."
The Canadian initiative, however, had lent a new twist to her 
admission policy. The concern now would be with the inter­
ests of the Taiwanese people as well as with world diplomacy.
This Canadian approach was substantially different in 
emphasis from that of the United States, which in that period, 
had been stressing the dangers of Communist subversion. With 
this action, under the Conservatives, Canada gradually would 
try to make recognition and admission possible under what she 
considered equitable conditions for all concerned. At the 
same time, the Canadian non-recognition policy would come 
under less criticism for an undue deference to United States 
policy.
Canada’s action in 1961 reflected what was a pragmatic
shift in her policy toward Red China. Speaking in the Commons
in 1959, then External Affairs Minister Smith had said that
Canada’s course should be "one of prudence based on an appre-
78
elation of the realities of the situation." In that vein.
77
Debates I960, p.738. Chou's statement apparently grew
out of concern for the "two China" solution which had been 
spoken of in many quarters for some time. The Canadian sta­
tement of 1 9 6 1 , however, was received with so much publicity 
and excitement that previous references were relatively un­
important as far as this paper is concérned. See Lyon, op. 
cit.. p.303-305.
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he felt that Canada should take the initiative in limited
79
fields, in fields of trade...." By her one-China, one- 
Taiwan policy, Canada, in effect, was divorcing the issue of 
Chiang’s Taiwan government from that of the recognition of
80
China. Thus, as trade with Peking increased in the sixties, 
Canada’s one-China, one-Taiwan policy evolved not only as an 
equitable but also as an advantageous approach to the Chinese 
question. With this approach Canada, by 1969, had laid the 
groundwork for the initiatives of the Trudeau government.
With the ^  facto recognition in a substantial increase 
in trade between China and Canada, Canadian non-recognition 
became less sensible. Similarly, with Canada's one-China, 
one-Taiwan policy, she could not be charged with neglecting 
the interests of Taiwan itself. Recognition as a course for 
Canada, therefore, became more logical. Continued non-recog­
nition moreover, in the face of expanded trade, would appear 
more like a deference to Washington than ever before.
It is significant to note, however, that during the mid­
dle sixties, the Senate Foreign Relation Committee Hearings 
on China, led by US Senator J.W. Fullbright began to take a 
new look at the China problem. The atmosphere in the United 
States, while not altogether in favor of recognition was none­
theless becoming less strident in opposing it. This is not 
to say that Canadian trade was directly Influenced by this
79
Ibid. p.l406.
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American attitude, but only that such attitudes made it less 
disadvantageous for Canada to seek new answers to the non- 
recognition question.
Basically, Canada's action in 1968-1969 reflected an at­
tempt to recognize Red China which had been a latent desire 
since 1949. Indeed, she had succeeded, in the twenty years 
from 1949 in reaching a modus vivendi with the Peking govern­
ment and, considering the American position In the same period, 
had been quite successful. There was indeed de facto diplo­
matic relations with Peking at Geneva and earlier in the 
Korean negotiations. What had happened under the 1968-1969 
Trudeau government was in fact a realization that non-recog­
nition as a policy for Canada had the effect of compromising 
Canadian prestige in foreign affairs. Her action in 1969, 
therefore, must be seen as an attempt not so much to thwart 
American policy as to advance the Canadian interest. In this 
respect the advantages of recognition outweighed the disad­
vantages of possible American reactions in Oanadlan-American 
relations. Similarly, if continued non-recognition at this 
stage had been pursued, it would have been valid to critici­
ze Canada for unduly defering to Washington. While, non-re­
cognition could have been justified in the earlier years 
because of Chinese intransigence and American over-sensitivity, 
those conditions no longer seemed to exist in the same degree 
that they had. It would appear, therefore, that there was 
a very real desire on Canada's part not to be beaten by the
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Americans on the recognition question, and thus once again 
putting herself in the position of following the American 
lead.
To further her own prestige, therefore, Canada has taken
a significant step toward recognizing the Peking regime. This
80
step is made easier, moreover, by dint of the rather relaxed 
position the American government had in 1966 through 1968, 
Because it is not a crucial issue at the present time Canada 
can further what she considers her own goals of independence In 
foreign policy instead of adopting a reflexive position, wait­
ing for Washington to act.
80
See Appendix II,
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CONCLUSION
While it is generally in the Canadian interest not to 
diametrically oppose United States policies, this discussion 
of Canadian-imerican interplay in Asia suggests that there 
will be times when this desire is superceeded by the way in
1
which Canada interprets the ramifications of those policies. 
In all of the areas under study, Canada has been in virtual 
agreement with most of the main 1 iness of AmeTican^p6ÏicliêsT
Significantly, however, this agreement has always been pred­
icated on the conditions that United StatëF'pôïiciês' would
not endanger world peace or visibly impede Canada's pursuit 
of self-interest. When these conditions were either unattain­
able or in jeopardy, Canada questioned American tactics al-
thougEshâstïïïagreed with the principles underlying those 
policies.
1
These remarks will be drawn from the proceeding discus­
sion of interplay in Asia, and are not necessarily intended 
to be universally applicable to Canadian and American polic­
ies. Indeed, different circumstances dictate different poli­
cy approaches, and what may have been true in Asian interplay 
may not be true in other areas. This analysis simply attempts 
to glean major Canadian reactions, and their justifications, to 
American policy in the Asian arena when circumstances demanded 
a choice between following or not following the American lead. 
However, a detailed study of Oanadlan-American policy in other 
areas might bear out many of the conclusions drawn here.
123
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Canadian actions in Vietnam and Korea can be separated 
somewhat from her policies on the question of Communist Chi­
nese recognition. In the first two instances, especially 
Korea, the dangers of world war were indeed present. In the 
last, it was not so much a direct threat to world security 
that was at stake as a furtherance of singularly Canadian in­
terests. Throughout all three areas, however, Canada has shown 
that her similarity to American policy is based on her own
perceptions as well as on deference to Washington.
It is significant to note that, in each of the areas un­
der discussion, Canada sought to reconcile her position with 
that of Washington in the early stages of mutual involvement, 
even though she did not ultimately align with American pol­
icy. This can be seen not only in her constant attempts to
modify the implications of that policy but also in her efforts
to bring about negotiations. In the Korean Crisis, Canada was 
among the first to seek United Nations help in utilizing the 
de facto cease-fire along the thirty-eighth parallel for nego­
tiation. In Vietnam, although the Canadian Influence may not
be known for some time, it is nonetheless probable that Chester
2
Honning's mission did innno mean way contribute to the Paris 
Peace Talks of 1968-1969. The Canadian accessability to both 
belligerents, moreover, cannot be discounted.
Canadian attempts toward negotiation show her concern not
2
Raskin and fall, op.cit.. p.470.
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only for world peace but also for the future of the Oanadlan-
American "partnership." Realizing that Canadian prosperity
    __ ^             .
depends significantly on American prosperity and cooperation,
she ^ e s  not want to needlessly endanger the rapport within 
which relations are conducted. By choosing not to indiscri- 
minately run counter to American policy, even though intern- 
al^urlLluy may M V o cate thi¥7"~Canah£r*oifers whatinant be cun<- 
strued as genuine concern for that nol^cv. It cannot he 
denied that the similar policies of Canada and the United 
States are conditioned in part by similar backgrounds and he­
ritages. For Canada however, the success of Canadian-American 
relations also depends a great deal on her general agreement 
with American policy. Thus, while Canada did disavow certain 
aspects of American policy, tnis came only wnen such policy
was thought to be on a collision course with world war. At
that time, Canada subjugated the concern for Canadian-America: 
rapport to the concern for Canadian security, ( 7 ) » ^
f  '
Importantly, this Canadian position has revealed the ex­
tent to which she has gone in sacrificing the marginal bene­
fits which might have accrued from a more favorable stance 
vis-a-vis Washington. While such benefits are always a matter 
of degree, Canadian policies have indicated that she would 
not go to the brink of war to achieve them. Although she 
might have satisfied her internal critics by her pursuit of 
a more declaratory and sometimes anti-American foreign policy, 
the point is that Canadian interests and interpretations were
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pursued, and that this meant a disavowal of certain American 
policies.
The method which Canada chose in this pursuit is also 
relevant, Canadian behaviour in the areas discussed exhibit
a dependence on quiet diplomacy in most of the early stages
of conflict. However, open diplomacy was used when Canadian
positions became Intractable. This utilization of open di- 
pTbmady ln""tiMFs' of crisis served a two-fold purpose.
By publicly refusing to endorse all the implications of 
American policy, Canada placated adherents of an "indepen- p 
dent foreign policy. More importantly, however, Canada em­
phasized what appeared to be an open break with ¥a"shingioïI.
This signaled an end to the typical American attituae oi tax- ^  
ing Canada for granted.
In addition to the unique ease in Canadian-American re­
lations since 1945, there has developed in Washington an 
attitude that on any given question, Canada would fully en­
dorse United States policy. While this has been shown to be 
false, the attitude is significant for it is an example of 
the faith which Washington has in Ottawa decision-makers.
Thus, when Canada does not completely conform to American po-
3
licy there arises not so much criticism as dismay and shock.
The effect of Canadian disavowal lies more in the intangible 
need for psychological approval than it does in hard and fast
3
Canadian tactics and opinions on trade with Communist 
countries is an important exception.
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practical support. In a word, the question is asked, "If 
we cannot count on Canada, then who is left?"
Canadian prestige since 1945 has been garnered more by 
her diplomacy and inoffensiveness than by the exercise of her 
limited power. Her support, therefore, brings with it this 
aura of goodwill and acceptability. This is what is sought 
after by Washington rather than an overt display of force.
The United States is rarely wanting in the resources to carry 
out a given policy, but lack of acceptability and justifica­
tion among her allies may often times tone down the implies - 
tiens for such policy.
This is not to say that American policy in the areas dis 
cussed was ultimately determined by the Canadian reaction. 
Indeed, the domestic environment in the United States was 
often the crucial factor in American decisions. It must be 
remembered, however, that in the early stages of each area 
of study, Canadian endorsement, either overt or tacit, was 
present. While American policy would most probably have evol­
ved in much the same manner without Canadian approval, it is
K  ' " "  I
not too much to suggest that Canadian hacking gave the 
psychological sanction which at least gave impetus to that
Since 1945, the reconciliation of Canadian independence 
with Canadian-American interdependence has been at the heart 
of interplay in Asia. For Canada, this reconciliation has 
always had a greater significance than for the United States,
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since it was, in fact, a search for a modus vivendi between 
f— —  ■"
the national interest in its many forms and United states 
predominance. Ultimately, however, Canada relied upon her 
own interpretation of self-interest, American preponderance 
not withstanding.
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APPENDIX I*
Ï3ADE OF CANADA (EXCLUDING GOLD), BY CONTINENTS, 1938-42
Values (Millions of Dollars)
Item And Continent
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
IMPORTS
Europe-
United Kingdom
Other Europe
119.3
39.9
114.0
37.1
1 6 1 . 2
19.2
219.4
6.9
161 .1 
5.2
North America- 
United States 
Other North America
424.8
17.4
496.9
17.1
744.2
24.6
1,004.5
36.6
1,304.7
3 2 . 9
South America 
Asia 
Oceania 
Africa
21.8
32.6
1 6 . 2
5.5
21.1 
38.1 
1 8 . 6
8.2
36.2
63.2 
25.8
7.6
5 6 . 8
7 4 . 8
36.9
12.9
44.1
46.2
36.2 
13.8
TOTALS IMPORTS 677.5 751.1 1,082.0 1,448*8 1,644.2
EXPORTS(DOMESTIO)
Europe-
United Kingdom 
Other Europe
339.7
78.1
328.1
57.9
508.1
28.7
6 5 8 . 2  
11 .6
741.7 
53.3
North America- 
United States 
Other North America
270.5
27.0
380.4
28.7
443.0
41.4
599.7
77.6
885.5
95.9
South America 
Asia 
Oceania 
Africa
14.0
36.3
51.2
20.8
1 6 . 2
44.8
46.1
22.7
21.0
35.7
45.2
55.9
2 9 . 8
6 9 . 6
4 9 . 1
1 2 5 . 4
' 19.8 
202.1 
110.6 
2 5 4 . 9
TOTALS, EXPORTS 837.6 924.9 1,179.0 1,621.0 2 ,3 6 3 . 8
*
Source ; Canada Year Book 1967.
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Appendix I continued.....
Percentages of Total
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
17.6 15.2 14.9 15.2 9.8
5.9 4.9 1 .8 0.5 0.3
62.7 66.1 68.8 69.3 79.4
2.6 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.0
3.2 2.8 3.3 3.9 2.7
4.8 5.1 5.8 5.2 2.8
2.4 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.2
0.8 1 .1 0.7 0.9 0.8
iOO.O 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
40.6 35.5 43.1 40.6 31.4
9.3 6.3 2.4 0.7 2.3
32.3 ' 4lil 37.6 36.9 37.5
3.2 3.1 3.5 4.8 4.0
1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 0.8
4.3 4.8 3.0 4.3 8.5
6.1 5.0 3.8 3.0 4.7
2.5 2.4 4.8 7.8 10.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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APPENDIX la*
TRADE OP CANADA BY LEADING COUNTRIES, 1966, MITE COMPARABLE
RANK
1964
IN-
1965 1 9 6 6 ITEM AND COUNTRY 1964 19.65_____
#'000 #"000 â'non
DOMESTIC EXPORTS ^
1 1 1 United States I 4 ,2 7 1 , 0 5 9 4,840,456 6 ,0 2 7 , 7 2 2
2 2 2 Britain \ 1 ,199,779 1 ,1 7 4 ,3 0 s 1 ,1 2 2 , 5 7 4
3 3 3 Japan \ 3 3 0 , 2 3 4 3 1 6 , 1 8 7 393,892
4 4 4 Union of Soviet Re­
publics 315,943 1 197,362 3 2 0 , 6 0 5
7 9 5 China, Communist 1 3 6 , 2 6 3  ! 105,131 184,879
5 5 5 Germany, Federal Re­
public 211,360 189,493 1 7 6 , 8 0 0
8 8 7 Netherlands 101,582 127,766 143,113
9 7 8 Belgium & Luxembourg 100,535 1 2 8 , 0 1 1 117,505
6 6 9 Australia 145,812 I 140,372 117,359
17 10 10 Italy 6 2 , 2 3 6 93,223 114,787
15 15 11 India 64,042 58,453 1 0 7 , 6 6 2
12 12 12 Norway 67,582 82,456 107,014
10 1 1 13 France 7 9 , 4 3 3 87,273 84,541
14 14 14 Venezuela 64,075 73,045 75,958
11 12 15 Republic of South
Africa 6 9 , 1 6 6 76,226 7 4 , 3 9 3
18 16 16 Cuba 6 0 , 9 3 0 5 2 , 5 9 4 61,436
13 17 17 Mexico 6 5 , 1 5 1 5 1 , 0 0 6 52,145
19 18 18 New Zealand 33,714 36,845 41,750
23 20 19 Argentina 26,889 3 2 , 7 2 0 3 9 , 5 2 9
16 21 20 Poland 6 2 , 6 5 3 3 1 , 5 6 5 37,404
26 19 21 Spain 21,235 3 3 , 8 2 5 36,900
20 23 22 Sweden 2 9 , 9 2 2 28,980 36,574
30 25 23 Peru 1 0 , 7 4 9 21,864 36,355
21 22 24 Jamaica 2 8 , 9 4 2 3 0 , 2 8 0 3 3 , 5 0 0
22 24 2 5 Switzerland 2 8 , 5 0 2 2 7 , 0 9 5 31,010
27 26 26 Pakistan 2 0 , 0 3 1 21,643 25,671
25 30 27 Colombia 2 1 , 2 5 2 17,362 25,397
2 8 27 28 Trinidad 17,791 2 1 , 5 3 2 23,337
24 29 29 Brazil 22,985 17,509 21,157
29 28 50 Puerto Rico 15v408 17.693 19.560
TOTALS, 3 0 LEADING
COUNTRIES 7.685,255 8,132,276 9,690_^52&
GRAND TOTALS, DO­
MESTIC EXPORTS 8 ,0 9 4 , 2 1 9 8.525,078 10.070.627
IMPORTS
1 1 1 United States 5,164,285 6,044,831 7 ,1 3 5 , 6 1 1
2 2 2 Britain 573,995 6 1 9 , 0 5 8 644,741
4 4 3 Japan 174,388 230,144 2 5 3 , 0 5 1
5 5 4 Germany, Federal Re­
public 1 7 0 , 3 9 2 209,517 2 3 5 , 2 0 7
3 3 5 Venezuela 2 7 0 , 6 2 1 2 5 4 ,6 7c 2 1 5 , 0 5 9
6 6 6 Prance 68,687 9 6 , 1 0 3 1 0 6 , 6 5 1
7 7 7 Italy 67,462 80,279 8 6 , 7 1 8
13 10 8 Sweden 3 8 , 7 9 4 55,568 72,541
9 8 9 Belgium & Luxembourg 59,198 7 2 , 0 2 7 61,555
11 9 10 Netherlands 39,933 56,274 60,489
8 11 11 Australia 59,827 47,372 59,573
14 12 12 Switzerland 36,932 4 3 , 9 8 6 5 0 , 2 7 9
*Source: Canada Yearbook 1967.
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APPENDIX Ib*
CANADIAN TRADE WITH CHINA AND JAPAN, 1870-1936
CHINA JAPAN
Exports to Imports from Exports to Imports from
1670............ # 36,782 # 432,919
1875   36,782 301 ,970
i8 6 0 ............  10,619 350,939 # 26,891 8 542,972
1885............  5,972 1 ,6 2 2 , 1 6 8  2 1 , 7 8 0  876,283
1 8 9 0 ............  3 4 , 9 2 6  86 1 ,047 2 6 , 8 2 5  1 ,2 5 8 , 7 6 3
1 8 9 5 ............  3 6 7 , 8 5 3  942,493 10,307 1 ,572,937
1900............  254,814 6 2 9 , 7 2 9  110,735 1 ,751 ,415
1 9 0 5 ............  9 8 0 , 8 7 6  541,837 5 0 8 , 6 0 9  1,928,886
1910............  1,249,189 799,708 659,118 1,673,542
1915............. 2 9 4 , 2 5 1  1,042,383 9 6 3 , 6 3 1  2,783,465
1920..............6 ,6 6 5 , 8 0 5  1,205,229 7,732,514 1 3,637,287
1 9 2  5 ............  7,838,187 2 ,5 2 1 , 8 7 4  2 2 ,0 1 1 , 0 8 8  7 ,0 0 5 , 0 5 6
1 9 3 0 .............1 6 ,5 2 7 , 9 5 9  2,977,022 30,475,581 12,537,253
193 5 ............  4,461,485 2,345,570 16,935,859 4,424,654
1 9 3  6 ............  4 ,5 5 5 , 7 2 6  3,717,181 14,844,137 3,466,081
193 7 ............  4,899,488 4,175,235 21 ,629,690 4,796,508
193 8 ............  3 ,3 5 4 , 2 2 8  3,341 ,243 26,639,885 5,782,416
LARGEST SINGLE YEAR
192 6 .............24,473,446 5,041 ,592
1920............  13,637,287
1 9 2 9 ............  42,099,968
*Source; A^K.Lower, Canada and the Far East - 1940, p.51.
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*APPENDIX II*
8IN0 CANADIAN TRADE 1961-19&6
(MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
Canadian Exchange % Of Canadian 
To China World Exchange
Communist Ohi- 
nese Exports 
To Canada
Canadian
Imports
1961 # 123 2.1 # 3 Negligible
1962 137 2.3 5 It
1963 97 1 .5 5 ft
1964 126 1 .6 9 I
1965 97 1 .2 13 I
1966 11 2 14 II
COMMUNIST CHINA'S GRAIN PURCHASES
(MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS)
Total Grain 
Purchases
Wheat Imports 
From Canada
Chinese Purchases 
From Canada as
of Canadian Total 
Wheat Exports
1961 6 .2 1.47 14.8
1962 5.3 1.95 24.2
1 9 6 3 5.7 1 . 4 7 1 3 . 7
1964 6.8 1.00 7.3
1 9 6 5 5.7 1.76 1 7 . 7
1966 1.63
Source: The Business Quarterly (Summer: 19 6 7 ) Vol.32, No.2,
Yuan-Li-Wu", "Oommunlst China’s Challenge To Canada",
.42-47,
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APPENDIX III
COLOMBO PLANS ALLOCATIONS 
(^THOUSANDS)
FISCAL TEAR ENDING MARCH 31 1951 to 
I960
1961 to 
1965 1 9 6 6
India Grants 1 6 6 ,5 2 3 . 0 127,404.1 3 6 ,9 7 6 . 4
Loans 33,000.0 10,000.0 20,000.0
Total 199,523.0 137,404.1 56,976.4
Pakistan Grants 114,802.7 70,355.2 11,999.8
Loans 7,000.0 12,000.0
Total 114,802.7 77,355.2 2 3 ,9 9 9 . 8
Ceylon Grants 2 1 ,9 4 5 . 0 9,701.7 3 ,4 9 4 . 9
Loans 1 ,9 7 6 . 2 — 1,000.0
Total 2 3 ,9 2 1 . 2 9,701.7 4 ,4 9 4 . 9
Malaysia Grants 2 ,4 4 2 . 9 8,976.9 2,000.0
Loans mm — mm
Total 2,442.9 8 ,9 7 6 . 9 2,000.0
Thailand Grant s 1 3 2 . 0 5 9 2 . 4 721 .2
Loans mm -
Total 132.0 592.4
South Vietnam Grants I 753.4 1 ,8 1 0 . 5 1 ,2 5 0 . 2
Loans 1 - - mm
Total 1 753.4 1 ,8 1 0 . 5
Cambodia and Laos Grants 398.2 732.9 299.6
Loans — — —
Total 398.2 7 3 2 . 9 2 9 9 . 6
Other South East Grants 6 ,6 0 2 . 7 8,03311 2 ,8 5 6 . 0
Asian Countries Loans — — —
Total 6 ,6 0 2 . 7 8,033.1 2 ,8 5 6 . 0
Unallocated Regional 
Reserve
Grant s
Loans
Total
Total Allocations 348,676.3 2 4 4 ,2 5 6 . 8 92,598.1
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APPENDIX III Continued,,.
1 9 6 7.____ 19 6 8 .... Total
9 8 ,4 5 5 . 1
20,000.0
5 6 ,9 7 6 . 4
5 2 .0 1 8 . 3  
38,000.0
9 0 .0 1 8 . 3
431.376.9 
121 ,000.0
6 0 2 .3 7 6 . 9
15,400.0^
12,000.0
27,400.0
1 0 .5 0 0 . 0  
1 8 ,0 0 0 . 0
28.500.0
2 2 3 .0 5 7 . 7  
4 9 ,0 0 0 . 0
2 7 2 .0 5 7 . 7
2.502.0 
2,000.0
4.505.0
2 .5 0 0 . 0  
2,000.0
4.500.0
40,146.6 
6,976.2 
4 7 ,1 2 2 . 8
1,700.00
1,000.0
2,700.0
1 .5 0 0 . 0
1.500.0 
3,000.0
1 6 .6 1 9 . 8
2 ,5 0 0 . 0
19.119.8
6 3 2 . 0
500.0 
1,132.0
8 0 0 . 0
5 0 0 . 0  
1,300.0
2.877.6 
1,000.0
3.877.6
2,000.0 2,604.6 8,418.7
2,000.0 2,604.6 8,418.7
200.0 5 0 3 . 9 2 ,4 3 4 . 6
500.0 503.9 2 ,4 3 4 . 6
1 .5 9 4 . 6  
500.0
2 .0 9 4 . 6
1.988.9 
5 0 0 . 0
2.488.9
21 ,373.0 
1 ,000.0 
22,373.0
4 ,9 1 9 . 1 4,919.1
4,919.1 4,919.1
ï5$;78667 1 3 2 ,9 1 5 . 7 4 ,9 1 9 . 1 982,402.6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX IV*
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 1968 
*
Source ; Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, 1 9 6 8 .
UNITED STATES ASSETS AND INVESTMENTS ABROAD
(^MILLIONS US)
1940 1 9 4 5 1 9 5 0 1955 i9 6 0 1964 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 6
12,275 1 6 , 8 1 8  31,539 43,323 67,964 99,117 106,174 111,874
(Asia) 2,291 3,112 3,569 3,891
APPENDIX IVb 
MAJOR U.S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
(&MILLION US) 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 7  
Far East (Total) l6,490
Far East Specific
Korea 4,320
China 2 , 1 8 8
Vietnam 3,229
APPENDIX IVc 
DEVELOPMENT LOANS (US GOVERNMENT) 
((MILLION US) 1958-1967 
East Asia and Vietnam (Total) 585,366
last Asia and Vietnam Specific
Bhina &54,397
Korea 291,189
Vietnam 37,3l6
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